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ABSTRACT 
Farmers engaged in small-scale agriculture in Africa generally have limited access to factors of 
production, credit and information. Empirical studies throughout the African continent have shown 
the extent to which high transaction costs constrain or prevent access to information and markets, 
especially for small-scale farmers . Despite these constraints, farmers in two communal areas of 
KwaZulu-Natal (Impendle and Swayimana) have managed to produce food for both own 
consumption and marketing. This study draws heavily on the New Institutional Economics, and 
particularly Transaction Cost Economics, which have demonstrated the important role of transaction 
costs in constraining economic activity, and of institutions developed to lower these costs . 
Transaction costs are the costs of exchange, including costs of information, negotiation, monitoring, 
coordination and enforcement of contracts. These costs can be implicit or explicit. 
The main objective of the study is to assess marketing constraints faced by communal farmers in the 
Impendle and Swayimana regions ofKwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Data were drawn from random 
sample of 120 household heads in each of the regions . In Swayimana, data were collected in January 
and February 1999 whereas the survey in Impendle was undertaken in April and May 1999. The 
empirical analysis attempts to identify factors determining the quality and number of marketing 
channels used (i .e. depth in marketing methods), which in turn affect the level of income generated 
from crop sales by small-scale farmers in the two study areas. The identification of such factors might 
support initiatives to create a more viable small-scale farming sector in the communal areas of 
KwaZulu-Natal. A block-recursive model was formulated and estimated using ordinary least squares 
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(OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). Empirical analysis of the OLS equation suggested that 
transaction cost variables are important in explaining the choice of, and depth in, marketing methods. 
Results of the combined samples indicate that cooperation with neighbouring commercial farmers, 
and the interaction of distance and ownership of a vehicle were the most important factors in the 
choice of marketing methods. Other factors such as the age of household head, having a formal bank 
account and the area of allocated arable land, also significantly and positively influenced the depth 
of marketing methods. At a regional level, the same equation revealed that while COOP was the most 
important factor in Swayimana, DISTRA and ACC were the main determinants in Impendle. The 
2SLS regression analysis indicated that greater depth in marketing methods, which reflects lower 
transaction costs faced by growers, has a strong and positive impact on the level of crop income 
generated; i.e. the lower the transaction costs faced, the greater is the depth in marketing methods, 
and the higher the level of crop income. The results imply that formal marketing channels are 
associated with low transaction costs and higher levels of crop income. The area of cultivated arable 
land and income from non-agricultural activities were the other two important determinants of crop 
mcome. 
It is concluded that accessibility to formal market outlets is limited by considerable farm-to-market 
distance, poor infrastructure (roads, telecommunications), and inadequate transportation. 
Recommendations give due consideration to the development of a better physical and institutional 
infrastructure which would effectively link these production areas to market centres and improve 
market knowledge by providing relevant market information and farming skills . 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of a population of approximately 8,5 million people in the province of KwaZulu-Natal , South 
Africa, 5,3 million (62%) live in rural areas - most of whom (75%) reside in the communal areas 
of the former KwaZulu homeland (Marcus et at. 1995).With a mean monthly household income 
" 
ofR788 and a mean monthly per capita income ofR126 in 1992, May (1995) concluded that over 
half the population (52%) in the province lives in poverty. While there is potential for small-scale 
farming there is also a great challenge for all institutions committed to improving the standard of 
living of rural people. The communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal account for 31 per cent (2,84 
million hectares) of the province' s land while commercial farms account for 4, 13 million hectares, 
or some 45 per cent of the land (KFC, 1995 :48-51). The former is dominated by subsistence 
agriculture characterised by low output and poor yields. For example, maize yields of small 
farmers in Region E, which comprises the province of KwaZulu-Natal and part of the former 
Transkei homeland, range from 0.4 tonlha in areas oflow potential to 1.2 tonlha in dryland areas 
of high potential. The average maize yield in the commercial farming areas ofKwaZulu-Natal is 
3.12 tons/ha (Smit and Brown, 1993). 
The former K waZulu homeland (hereafter referred to as K waZulu the communal areas of 
KwaZulu-Natal) has seen a rapid acceleration of semi-commercial agriculture since the mid 1980's 
(Smit and Brown, 1993). Cultivation has become an important support strategy for more than half 
of the population, despite production and marketing constraints. Surveys in this region have 
suggested that income generated from subsistence or semi-commercial farmers amounts to no 
more than 10% of household income (Smit and Brown, 1993). Major contributors to household 
income in the communal areas are formal wages, followed by wage remittances, entrepreneurial 
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activities and welfare or pension transfers (Marcus e/ at. 1995). 
Small-scale agriculture in South Africa cannot be ignored as it has the potential to become a major 
source of employment and political stability (Delgado, 1999). Farmers engaged in small-scale 
agriculture have limited access to factors of production, credit and information. Markets are often 
constrained by inadequate property rights and high transaction costs (Lyne, 1996). Despite these 
barriers, many communal farmers in KwaZulu-Natal manage to produce food for both own 
consumption and marketing. Their produce is sold through formal and informal channels. 
The causes of low productivity and poor performance in the small-scale sector have been 
researched and debated. Several empirical studies have dealt with the constraints faced by small-
scale farmers in the former homelands of South Africa. Some of these studies have examined only 
a limited range of questions relating to land tenure, delivery of services or access to credit (Barnes 
and Morris, 1997; Jones et at. , 1996; Thomson, 1996; Kuhn et at. , 2000; Fenwick and Lyne, 1999). 
These studies consider the lack of assets, market information and education, as well as poor 
physical and institutional infrastructure to be the most important barriers to market participation. 
They recognise that better access to production services (i .e. extension, inputs, credit and product 
markets) by small-scale farmers is pivotal to increasing market participation by communal farmers, 
and should constitute the backbone of any agricultural development initiative. Empirical studies 
throughout the African continent have shown the extent to which high transaction costs (i .e. costs 
of doing business) constrain or prevent access to information and markets, especially for small-
scale farmers (Delgado, 1999; Goetz, 1992; Makhura,200 1). This research builds on these studies 
and attempts to assess the direct impact of transaction costs on the choice of marketing channels 
and crop income. 
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Ifincreasing farm incomes for small-scale farmers is an important policy objective, then problems 
related to marketing of agricultural products have to be of paramount concern. Large multiplier 
effects in the rural non-farm sector mean that agriculture can make a substantial contribution to 
the rural economy provided surpluses are sold, that is, provided cash incomes increase for the 
majority of households (Ngqangweni, 2000, cited by Makhura,200 1). 
A particular feature ofthis study is that it focuses on socio-economic characteristics and resource 
endowments of small-scale farmers when explaining their ability to generate income from the sale 
offood crops. It examines various challenges and constraints faced by these farmers that hinder 
their quest for higher productivity and farm incomes. Furthermore, the empirical analysis provides 
pragmatic policy recommendations to enhance market participation amongst small-scale farmers, 
converting them from subsistence to commercial farmers, and thus stimulating the rural economy 
through higher crop incomes. 
The thrust of the study, however, centres on marketing constraints faced by communal, small-
scale farmers in the Impendle and Swayimana regions of KwaZulu-Natal, and on ways of 
alleviating these constraints. The study relies on theory drawn from Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) . It constructs an index representing the transaction costs that influence marketing methods 
and the level of crop income. Furthermore, the study considers arguments supporting the idea of 
promoting efficient institutions to reduce transaction costs and assesses ways in which such 
institutions can be influenced by the social, cultural and political-economic environments. 
The New Institutional Economics (NIB), concentrates on transaction costs and the institutions 
developed to lower these costs (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985, 1987; North, 1981 ,1997; Dorward 
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et aI. , 1998). Smallholders in Africa often face high transaction costs in production and marketing 
of agricultural outputs due to the nature of their products and the institutional environment in 
which they have to operate (Delgado, 1999; Lyne, 1996). North (1990) defines transaction costs 
as the costs involved in exchange or trade (e.g. marketing costs), costs of intangibles (such as 
search for exchange partners), contract monitoring and enforcement. Moreover, transport, 
handling, packaging and storage costs should be included with transaction costs in Sub-Saharan 
African countries (Delgado,1997). Generally, transaction costs can be explicit and/or implicit. 
Explicit transaction costs include transport costs, for example bus fares, while implicit transaction 
costs include the opportunity cost of time spent searching for new partners/customers, gathering 
market information, traveling and waiting time. The implicit costs are usually higher, suggesting 
that proximity to institutions such as markets and banking facilities is crucial. The size of these 
costs depend on the degree of market organization and the development of the physical and 
institutional infrastructure (Gonzalez-Vega, 1993). Transaction costs vary by product, type of 
agent in the marketing chain and farmers or rural households with different asset bases. The terms 
on which transactions take place are complex and diverse, and may be strongly structured by 
ideological and social factors such as gender, class and caste. High transaction costs mean that 
it is not worthwhile for many rural household to participate in critical markets (especially for 
credit, food, insurance, and labour), even if these markets exist (Harris et aI1995) . 
Institutions are the formal laws and informal conventions that influence transaction costs and 
shape the benefits offered by trade and exchange (North, 1990). According to North (1997), the 
three landmarks in the historical reduction of transaction costs were the institutions (economic 
and political) that made possible impersonal exchange, the protection and enforcement of 
property rights by the state, and the green revolution research in agriculture. Broadly speaking, 
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the economic institutions have been those that permitted the growth of markets (e.g. rules of 
exchange) or improvements in, or the introduction of, new technology ( e.g. telecommunications). 
The political institutions have been those that improved the security of property rights and the 
enforcement of contracts. The historical decline in transaction costs has been reflected by both 
own accord and coercive solutions to problems of exchange (North, 1997). 
Achieving rural economic growth will require the participation of small-scale farmers in various 
markets (land, credit, input, product and contractor services). Government policies, education, 
market information and access to capital are important factors in market participation by small-
scale farmers in Third World countries (Delgado, 1997). Thus, policies affecting rural marketing 
institutions, property rights and both physical and legal infrastructure which deal effectively with 
transaction cost obstacles within the communal areas ofKwaZulu-Natal are needed. 
Under structural adjustment policies initiated by the World Bank during the early 1980's, 
privatizing or liberalizing agricultural marketing - together with appropriate macroeconomic and 
trade policy reforms - was widely expected to increase producer profits and bring forth a strong 
production response, contributing towards agricultural development, social upliftment and the 
reduction of rural poverty (World Bank, 1994). This neo-classical approach, however, overlooked 
the institutional environment under which small-scale farmers operate. Disappointing outcomes 
throughout the continent have prompted renewed research attention to agricultural markets in 
developing countries (Jones, 1996). This study hypothesizes that growth in small-scale agriculture 
is limited by high transaction costs in both production and marketing of products by emerging 
small-scale farmers . Understanding the nature of these constraints and how they can be alleviated 
is central to using small-scale agricultural development as a tool to improve rural livelihoods 
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(Delgado, 1996). In African economies that are only partly commercialized, as is the case with 
most former homelands in South Mrica, small-scale farmers are likely to face higher transaction 
costs per unit of production than larger producers because many transaction costs (especially 
information costs) are fixed costs. These fixed costs are exacerbated by poor access to market 
information and technology (needed to enter into new activities), inadequate transportation and 
telecommunication services, and bad roads. 
Poor market knowledge and structural imperfections (Delgado, 1999) as well as small fann sizes 
(Nieuwoudt, 1990) have often been asserted to be the cause oflow productivity and income in the 
small-scale farming sector of South Africa (causing sector stagnation), but the role of transaction 
costs and institutions designed to reduce them are not well understood . Transaction cost-related 
studies have been emerging in recent years throughout South Mrica (Fitschen and 
Klitgaardt, 1996; Thomson, 1996; Fenwick, 1998; Makhura,200 1; Crookes ,2001 and Matungul 
et al. 2001) . However, there has been no empirical study that analyses the implicit relationship 
between transaction cost factors and the income generated from the sale offood crops by small-
scale farmers in the communal areas ofKwaZulu-Natal. Even less is known about the impact of 
informal institutions that influence the transaction costs facing these farmers . 
Objectives of Study 
The overall aim of this research is to identify marketing constraints faced by small-scale farmers 
in KwaZulu-Natal, and to help in the design and implementation of policies that are directed 
towards promoting sustainable small-scale farming in the communal areas of South Mrica, in the 
context of agricultural policy reform and trade liberalization. The study tests the hypothesis that 
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small-scale farmer participation in product markets and revenue from crop sales are adversely 
affected by high transaction costs. The empirical objective is to determine the impact of 
transaction cost proxies on the marketing methods used by small-scale farmers in two communal 
regions of KwaZulu-Natal, namely Impendle and Swayimana, which, in turn, determines their 
level of crop income. The extent to which household characteristics and transaction cost variables 
influence marketing methods is assessed in terms of the farmer 's ability to discover market outlets, 
new partners and marketing information at lower costs. Related objectives include identifying the 
nature of transaction costs and determining their impact on the ability of small-scale farmers to 
market agricultural products. To contextualise the study it is necessary to identify major factors 
influencing the marketing system within the study areas, to examine obstacles preventing the 
integration of emerging farmers into existing marketing channels, and to consider the role of 
extension services and other administrative support in reducing transaction costs. Specifically, this 
study aims to achieve the following : 
1) Determine the current marketing situation in Impendle and Swayimana in terms of the 
following criteria: 
- marketing channels (formal and informal) currently utilised for the sale of food crops 
- how much of each product was sold and where it was sold 
- pricing practices 
- distance to main markets and banking facilities 
- roads and telecommunication infrastructure 
- the specific needs of small farmers concerning marketing activities and the availability of market 
outlets. 
2) Investigate socio-economic variables detrimental to the low level of crop production in 
particular, and farming in general. • 
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3) Evaluate the contribution or lack of contribution of extension officers in terms of their 
knowledge of agricultural marketing and of the prevailing situation within their area of 
responsibility. 
4) Draw conclusions and make suggestions regarding the improvement of the production and 
marketing system to better meet the needs of small-scale farmers in the communal areas of 
Impendle and Swayimana. 
To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, a sample survey will be conducted in the two study 
areas. Empirical methodologies, including principal component analysis (PCA) and a two-stage 
least squares model, will be used to identify the main determinants of transaction costs. 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) and its relevance to development is introduced in the first 
chapter, followed by an introduction to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) in chapter 2. 
Research sites and data collection procedures are presented in chapter 3. The questionnaire used 
for the survey is also explained in this chapter. In chapter 4 descriptive statistics of the socio-
economic characteristics of the sample population are presented, as well as factors influencing 
marketing activities in the study areas. Chapter 5 deals with the empirical analysis of marketing 
methods and crop income. Factors influencing marketing methods and crop income are discussed, 
and a block-recursive model developed and estimated using OLS regression (to identify factors 
influencing marketing methods) and 2SLS regression to identify factors influencing crop income. 
Conclusions and recommendations for policy initiatives and further research are presented in 
chapter 6, and the study findings are summarised in chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Conceptual theories which underlie arguments both for and against the role of governments and 
local institutions in resource allocation and management are discussed in this chapter, along with 
the possibility of developing a more sustainable approach which takes account of existing physical 
and institutional arrangements. This chapter draws heavily on the New Institutional Economics 
theory with reference to communal small-scale farmers in the study areas. It should be noted that 
despite the poor physical and institutional infrastructure in these rural areas, many changes or 
innovations have occurred or are under way since the survey took place in 1999. These include, 
for example, the electrification of certain areas, and improvements to graveled roads within the 
survey regions. Moreover, the municipal elections in 2000 brought about a new configuration and 
dispensation for districts throughout the country. Also, under the new dispensation, if 
implemented, the tribal authority is expected to be assigned to deal only with tribal matters. 
1.1 NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (NIE): CONCEPT AND THEORIES 
The New Institutional Economics (NIB) theory, which has provided a number of insights into the 
behaviour of modern households in developed countries (Dietrich, 1994; Dugger, 1993; 
Williamson,1999; Coase, 2000), can certainly enable the behaviour of subsistence farm-
households in Africa and their response to development initiatives to be seen in a new perspective. 
This new perspective has particular relevance at a time when sustainable small-scale commercial 
agriculture has taken centre stage within the policy of empowerment and betterment of rural 
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households conditions throughout South Africa (Jones et al. , 1993). State regulations, ill-defined 
property rights and other constraints do not stimulate economic activity, but discourage it. "Some 
organisations that operate within developing countries ' institutional frameworks are not 
inefficient, they are efficient at making a society more unproductive" (North 1990:9) . This study 
borrows from the New Institutional Economics, particularly Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), 
in order to understand marketing problems faced by emerging small-scale farmers in South Africa. 
In so doing, the study should provide an explanation of the generally poor performance of 
agricultural projects in rural areas and an understanding of why development strategies and 
technologies succeed in one region and fail in another. 
According to Low (1986 :2), the underdevelopment of the indigenous sectors in southern Africa 
stresses either historical neglect and policy discrimination or institutional bias that favoured large-
scale modern, urban and capital-intensive production over small-scale peasant farming . To correct 
these inequalities, many efforts were made through various schemes (e.g. rural infrastructure, 
marketing boards, credit facilities, extension, etc .). However, despite all the efforts, the results 
have been below expectations in most developing countries (Low, 1986). 
This observation, therefore, calls for a different way of looking at small-scale agricultural 
development in the Third World countries. The importance given to the interaction between 
institutions and organisations makes the NIE approach especially relevant for long-run Third 
World development (Harris et al. , 1995). Its recognition of the cultural-institutional change and 
the prospect of positive institutional change as a result of individual actions, can be used to 
analyse development projects throughout the Third World. The NIE can be used in assessing 
market formation ( or failure) , in particular the creation of a framework for individual 
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maximisation, the role of the state in setting and policing the rules of the game and the influence 
of interest groups or organisations in shaping institutions in the Third World (Harris et al. , 1995). 
Nabli and Nugent (1989) argue that in mainstream neo-classical economics, four main types of 
constraints have received considerable attention : individual preferences, technological 
opportunities, physical and human capital endowments and market opportunities. In such analyses, 
the institutional framework has almost always been taken as given, and in many cases has even 
been altogether forgotten. The explicit or implicit assumption of given institutions, they believe, 
is especially unrealistic and limiting in the context of economic development. The goal of the NIE 
is to overcome these important limitations of mainstream neo-classical economics (Nabli and 
Nugent, 1989). 
To Nabli and Nugent (1989) NIE represents the intersection of a number of different lines of 
investigation, including among others, the analysis of behavioural norms, the integration of 
persons with different tastes and preferences into voting coalitions, interest group formation, the 
problems of and prerequisites for (successful) collective action, transaction costs, organisation 
theory, limitations on the rationality of human behaviour, the determinants of firm structure, 
coordination problems, rent-seeking behaviour, technological change and its relationship to 
institutional change, and the determinants and effects of property rights. Many of these lines of 
investigation within the NIE are interdisciplinary. 
Bates (1989) also thinks that the NIE offers ways of understanding the economic significance of 
features of Third World societies and cultures that market-based reasoning might misunderstand 
or ignore (e.g. different forms of contracts) . The NIE does not exclude alternative options, and 
the proper role of this theory might be to provide diagnoses rather than to prescribe cures, where 
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non-market institutions and market failure are of particular importance. Furthermore, institutional 
change can be considered to be the focus of the long run process of economic development, 
providing the missing link between development and growth (Nabli and Nugent, 1989). Nabli and 
Nugent (1989) argue that it might be appropriate to define economic development as economic 
growth accompanied by "efficient" institutional change. There exist many interrelationships 
between institutions and economic growth. First, economic growth can, and most of the time 
does, stimulate changes in institutions and, secondly, institutions can profoundly influence the 
level and rate of economic growth (Nabli and Nugent,1989) . By affecting transaction costs, 
institutions can have the effect of either facilitating or retarding economic growth. Appropriate 
political institutions, rules and policies will stimulate economic growth. Institutions also affect 
growth through their effects on expectations, social norms and preferences. 
With respect to the effect of economic growth on institutions, economic growth may provoke 
changes in contractual choices, the importance of markets, the extent of private property rights, 
the relative importance of different constraints and in technological choices. Economic growth 
can make some existing institutions obsolete and lead to the creation of new ones. However, the 
opposing view considers that institutions may not always evolve "efficiently" (Nabli and 
Nugent, 1989). Institutional inflexibilities sometimes prevent adaptations to the various 
environmental changes and make existing institutions inefficient. Nabli and Nugent (1989) point 
out that some institutional alternatives may be eliminated from the feasible set by historical 
precedent. The influence exerted by existing institutions may be one of the main forces impacting 
on the institutional choices. Also, institutions which benefit just a few may be kept if each member 
of the particular society fears being punished or excluded for not adhering to the institutional 
rules . Institutional change may be prevented by high cost of collective action and by political 
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resistance (Lyne et at. , 1997:64). The application of NIE to development policy could lead to 
significant new policy initiatives in less developed countries in general, and in less developed 
regions of South Africa in particular. 
1.2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS AND EVOLUTION 
The importance or relevance of institutions and the incentives derived from them to promote 
economic efficiency have been widely considered since the successful experience of China with 
decollectivisation of agriculture in the early 1980s (Lin & Nugent, 1995). According to North 
(1997), the key to the expansion of trade and an era of substantial economic growth between the 
eleventh and fourteenth centuries in Europe was the development of a set of institutions that 
allowed anonymous exchange to take place across space and time. Inter-community credit 
markets, insurance markets, contracts for future delivery, and the bill of exchange were all 
institutional features of this commercial revolution. Broadly speaking, the economic institutions 
have been those that allowed the growth of markets or improvements in, or the introduction of, 
new technologies. The political institutions are those that improve the security of property rights 
(North, 1997). Nowadays, new legal arrangements and new marketing techniques have emerged, 
and are continually emerging, to reduce transaction costs. Institutional reform should be able to 
reconcile both formal and informal institutions. 
There are other pertinent local and international examples highlighting the difficulties, success and 
progress associated with institutional transformation. Graham and Lyne (2000), for example, 
outline the progress ofland redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal. Barkan and Chege (1989) highlight 
the difficulties of institutional transformation in Kenya in their analysis of that country 's attempts 
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to decentralise the state as a mechanism for initiating rural development. They show that attempts 
at state decentralisation will not impact significantly on established institutional relationships 
unless there is a fundamental reallocation of state funds to newly created tiers of government, 
something which, they contend, did not occur in Kenya. Cousins and Robins (1993) point to the 
various institutional problems in their study of Zimbabwe's land redistribution and management 
experience. They demonstrate that the "top-down" approach by the state to institutional 
development in land redistribution is a major factor limiting the success of the programme in 
Zimbabwe. They show how, as in the case of Kenya, an important development initiative was 
undermined by a static institutional environment that was unable to adapt to changing 
development needs. 
Institutions are created in response to problems of organization of information, of transactions 
and of property rights, under condition of environmental and biological differences and 
uncertainty, and bounded rationality (because of informational uncertainty and the distribution of 
cognitive competence). Under circumstances of specialization or lack of it in production and 
marketing, as well as underdevelopment of information infrastructure, information may be costly 
to obtain, control or transfer (Lin and Nugent, 1995). Information and monitoring and 
enforcement costs are components of a broader set of costs necessary to the making and 
protection of contracts, and are known as transaction costs. These include the costs of search and 
screening, of negotiating and transfer of property rights, of co-ordination, and of safeguarding 
contracts. Institutions (i.e. formal or informal rules) are efficient responses to transaction costs. 
Transaction costs increase with distance, market concentration, systemic complexity and declining 
clarity of property rights, and decrease with relational contracts, with the standardization of 
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measurement technologies for quantity and quality, and when investments are flexible and not 
specific (Marion, 1986, cited by Harriss-White, 1999). 
The NIE suggests that the policy framework dealing with development in general , and particularly 
with rural development issues, must recognize that institutional factors are important determinants 
of the development process. Development cannot be looked at without considering the 
institutional environment in which it is to take place, and that development is highly dependent 
upon the establishment of a sound development-oriented and structured institutional environment 
capable of delivery (North, 1997; Ensminger, 1992). Depending on whether reference is made to 
institutions or organisations, institutions (formal and informal) are patterns of behaviour 
embedded in social relations and recognized and valued by society (North, 1981), while 
organisations are purposeful, structured and role-bound social units (Fowler, 1992: 14). In sum, 
institutions are systems of enforceable and legitimate rules, while organisations are actual systems 
of cooperation where people get together in order to carry out a designated function (North, 
1990). The two definitions are frequently vague because they both shape and direct social 
behaviour, and institutionalised social behaviour is to a large extent expressed by work and 
interaction between people in organisations. As a result, the institutional approach contends that 
although organisations are an important element of the overall institutional environment, it is the 
institutional environment itself that determines organisational activity, and not the other way 
round. The policy implication of this view is that the institutional environment itself should be at 
the centre of any development analysis. 
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1.3 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EFFICIENT INSTITUTIONS 
Institutional environments are important determinants of societal activity. People' s actions and 
their ability to perform tasks are largely determined by the institutional environment in which they 
find themselves (Barnes and Morris, 1997; North, 1990). Unless the appropriate service delivery 
organisations are in the right place at the right time, and operate within a stable development-
oriented institutional environment, the delivery will not take place (Barnes and Morris, 1997). 
The absence or underdevelopment of various markets, such as those for finance ( credit), insurance 
and future transactions of commodities, skilled workers and managers, is itself a subject of interest 
that may be analyzed in institutional terms. By being party to contracts and being able to set rules 
and constraints, governments in less-developed countries can change the nature and role of 
transaction and information costs, either reducing their importance or magnifying them and 
thereby creating additional sources of opportunistic behaviour. Numerous interrelationships 
between institutions and economic growth can be identified. On the one hand, economic growth 
can and frequently does trigger changes in institutions and, on the other hand, institutions can 
profoundly influence the level and rate of economic growth . By affecting transaction costs and 
coordination possibilities, institutions can have the effect of either facilitating or retarding 
economic growth (Lin and Nugent, 1995). 
Appropriate political institutions, rules and policies enhance economic growth. Social norms also 
play an important role in affecting the extent to which growth-enhancing activities can take place. 
F or example, religious norms may either encourage or inhibit money and entrepreneurial activities. 
The key in a market economy is private property and individual freedom. Property rights regime 
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heavily influence agroindustrialization in developing countries (Escobal et at. 2000). Mises 
(1949), cited by Ebeling (1990), explained that the institution of private property made all this 
possible. Ownership and voluntary exchange create opportunities for gains from trade. 
Competitive bids and offers for various goods (i .e. land, water) and services (i.e. transport, 
tractors) generate market prices at which transactions are consummated. These prices would 
convey useful information to everyone in the market about what products are in demand in the 
rest of the region or world. 
Private ownership of the means of production permits the acquisition and hire of resources (e.g. 
arable land) and labour for the production of goods that consumers may desire to purchase. By 
not allowing private ownership of the means of production eliminates peaceful, voluntary 
exchange (Ebeling, 1990). 
1.4 STATE VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR 
1.4.1 The role of the state in reducing transaction costs 
Several implications for the role of the state in the economy flow from transaction cost 
economics. Yet, these implications have been largely ignored in the rapidly growing transaction 
costs literature (Dugger, 1993). Dugger (1993) addresses the gap in terms of four questions: a) 
What is the role of the state in the institutionalisation of exchange transactions? b) What is the role 
of the state in settling disputes that arise from exchange transactions? c) In the provision of public 
goods (roads, telecommunication, etc.), should the state make or buy them? d) What kind of state 
should be chosen to rely on for institutional ising exchange transactions, settling disputes and 
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providing public goods? The state plays a determining role in the institutionalisation of exchange 
transactions. The state' s definitions and protection of property rights are essential to exchange. 
Furthermore, he adds, the state helps to establish, interpret and enforce a whole series of rules and 
procedures governing specific exchange processes. 
Institutions that have the effects of decreasing transaction costs not only make trade more 
profitable, but may also increase competition in different sectors of trade, thus allowing those with 
less capital to break into one stage of the marketing process (Ensminger, 1992). Examples of such 
institutions are: 
- The simple notarizing of legitimate traders and property rights by third-party agencies, 
- Security forces that reduce crime, 
- Banking facilities that extend credit and reduce the danger of travel with cash, 
- The regulation of weights and measures, 
- Courts that enforce contracts and property rights, 
- Telecommunication and roads (which increase the flow of information and traffic) . Ensminger 
(1992) believes that a clear presence of these institutions will certainly lead to a greater 
involvement in all aspects of agricultural marketing by the targeted population. 
Also, North (1981) thinks that the state can realize economies of scale in the provision and 
regulation of institutions such as those described earlier, further reducing transaction costs. As 
more economically efficient state institutions reach further into peripheral areas, the costs of 
transactions decline and are shifted from local traders and producers to the state. Consequently, 
the relative profitability of trade increases, and more actors are pulled into exchange. With 
increasing commercialization, Ensminger (1992) concludes that new economic opportunities for 
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the poor and middle households may bring positive changes such as increasing real income and 
consumption, more favourable terms of trade, better education and health care, improvement in 
nutritional status, lower interest rates and less discriminatory policy against poor households. 
Many of these, he adds, can be related to government policies such as structural adjustment, 
policies that reduce transaction costs and therefore increase profits to traders and/or producers, 
and a more effective central government. 
Marketing proceeds more smoothly and cheaply when the local government is able to protect 
those involved against violence, theft and extortion. The use of weights, measures and quality 
descriptions understood by market participants reduces the area of disagreement and allowances 
that must be made for risk of fraud . Public provision for the enforcement of contracts and 
penalties for non-completion is a basic requirement (Abbott, 1987). Abbott (1987) argues that the 
provision of public goods such as roads, bridges, and other means of transport, together with 
communication services, are services to marketing that can be expected of a government in 
reducing transaction costs. 
The provision of organized markets - local assembly, wholesale, retail, at convenient places - is 
a similar central or local public responsibility. The assembly and dissemination of information on 
crop prospects and prices and supplies in producer, wholesale and retail markets is also needed 
because it can usually be undertaken more efficiently on behalf of all market participants than by 
anyone individual. The development of a banking system oriented to financing marketing 
operations may also need government assistance. Government may also be called upon to help 
the poorer and more socially-handicapped stratum of farmers (Abbott, 1987). At the level oflegaJ 
procedure, the state is necessary to guarantee property rights, to specify acceptable terms and 
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conditions of contract, to sanction lack of adherence to contracts, and to provide physical 
infrastructure and other public goods for markets. This in line with North (2000) who sees the 
role of the state as crucial in specifying property rights and enforcing contracts, both of which 
promote specialisation and reduce the costs of market exchange. 
1.4.2 Private sector role in marketing 
The private marketing enterprise is one in which the capital is owned directly by the managers of 
the enterprise, by these managers in partnership with others, or by private investors who have 
acquired shares in such a company. In most African countries, private enterprises are the most 
numerous of those engaged in marketing food and agricultural products (Abbott,1987). This 
private sector, which often operates alongside marketing co-operatives and state marketing 
organisations, contains an important and often underused reservoir of dynamic marketing 
entrepreneurship (Harper and Kavura,1982). The productivity of small farmers cannot be 
successfully increased without effective marketing systems for both their products and the inputs 
they require. An effective marketing system encourages increased agricultural production of the 
right products by offering incentive prices. 
If the marketer (the middleman) is in continuous contact with small farmers in rural markets or 
on the farm itself, he can guide them to the market and improve their productivity through the 
adoption of better farming methods and modern inputs. Partly, the marketing system can be 
improved by improving communications (building and improving feeder roads, telephone and mail 
links). However, one essential instrument of rural development is the dynamic small and medium-
scale marketing entrepreneurs who consistently promote sales and search for new market outlets 
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as well as organise other marketing operations such as assembly, storage, processing, distribution, 
financing and pricing. In spite of the efforts of many governments and co-operatives, the private 
sector in fact handles the bulk of agricultural and food products in developing countries (Harper 
and Kavura, 1982). Also, despite the difficult conditions under which these marketers often 
operate, they make considerable contributions to rural development by opening new marketing 
channels and extending existing ones in response to the rapid increase in the demand for food in 
urban areas. These private entrepreneurs not only create their own employment, but also create 
employment for others and provide a service for hundreds or even thousands of farmers and 
consumers (Harper and Kavura, 1982). 
Small and medium-scale type of private enterprises will continue to play an important and 
expanding role in agricultural marketing in most developing countries. Therefore, sufficient 
attention should be paid to the ways in which they can be used and assisted in performing 
effective roles in rural development. The least a government could do is to attempt to create an 
environment which is conducive to the establishment and growth of small private marketing 
entrepreneurship and also to recognise and acknowledge the important role of the individual 
private entrepreneur. In short, an effective integration of private marketing enterprises into the 
national agricultural, rural and marketing policies should be considered (Harper and Kavura, 
1982). 
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1.5 INFRASTRVCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND MARKET ACCESS 
1.5.1 Infrastructural development 
Transport, telecommunications, and power (electricity) are the "hardcore" elements ofinfrastructural 
elements as they are basic to numerous economic activities. In addition, the constraints imposed by 
underdevelopment of many other infrastructural elements (e.g. health services, education and training) 
could be alleviated once the hard core elements are solidly in place, that is, as transport and 
communication systems develop, law and order improve, market imperfections and failures are 
reduced, and access to health, education, and electricity facilities is enhanced. In this way, transport 
and communications are the leading elements of infrastructural development (Ahmed, 1993). 
Indirect benefits from infrastructural development may not be easily recognized as potential users and 
may not always strongly state their preferences. In general, a government has to be perceptive to 
recognize the potential demand and to act accordingly as a supplier of infra structural facilities . These 
benefits can be complex but comprehensive. Conventionally, the economic factor that has been 
instrumental in the formation of views on the benefits from infrastructural investment at the 
policymaking level is the concept of "user cost savings" arising from investment relative to investment 
cost (Ahmed, 1993). 
1.5.1.1 User cost saving approach 
To estimate the user cost savings as a measure of benefits, for instance from a road project, is shown 
in figure 1.1 where DD is the demand curve for transport services, while the horizontal axis represents 
volume of traffic and the vertical axis represents the unit cost of transportation 
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With walking and headload as means of transportation (before the road project), the unit cost is 
OCI and the volume of traffic OQI . This cost is reduced to OC2 when the road project is 
developed. This reduction also induces additional traffic (OQ2 - OQI), which is determined by 
the elasticity of DD. The total benefits from the development of the road are given by the area 
AC IC2B which consists of two components: 
Cost savings on existing traffic = AC I C2E; and 
Cost savings on generated traffic = \t1 (C 1C2) (OQ2 - OQI) = AEB 
This conventional approach would fit developed economies where resources are fully employed. 
Unit cost D' 
of transport 
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Figure 1.1. User Cost Saving Approach 
Source: Ahmed,1993 
However, in developing economies, as is the case of the two study areas (Impendle and 
Swayimana), where resources are under-utilised and imperfect markets exist, road development 
24 
can be expected to bring about substantial structural change. If this happens, the demand curve will 
shift to the right to D'D ' under which the benefit from additional traffic generated will be ABHF, 
which is much larger than the benefit AEB from additional traffic under the previous case (DD). This 
approach, however, takes into account only traded goods, i.e. goods that are transported from one 
location to the other and also may not reflect effects on employment. 
1.5.1.2 Impact of infrastructure 
Development economists have for long suggested that the creation of an infrastructure generates 
external economies resulting in widespread benefits (Ahmed and Donavan, 1992). Figure].2 shows 
how traditional theory conceptualizes the effects of infrastructural development on production for a 
competitive market economy. In a situation of inadequately developed infrastructure, as is the case 
in Impendle and Swayimana, farms are faced with higher marginal cost (Me 1) at every level of 
production, and given the market price of their output, produce at Q 1. 
CQst 
($ ) Mel 
Price ~~----------------------~~~?f------------
sav1ngs 
1 nfras tructUl-e 
aL----
dl---
Ql 02 Output 
Figure 1.2 Infrastructure provision and the efficiency of production 
Source: Ahmed and Donavan, 1992 
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With an improvement in infrastructure, the marginal cost curve shifts downward to the right 
(Me2), resulting in a total cost savings of area abed for the previous level of output, Q 1, and an 
increase in output from Q 1 to Q2. Area bee represents the cost saved because of improved 
infrastructure. Interaction between physical and institutional infrastructure is very important. 
Physical infrastructure, such as a road provided at public cost, is intended to create a condition 
that will induce supplementary investment from private entrepreneurs (transportation vehicles, 
shops, industries). Public investment in building marketplaces at appropriate locations has been 
very productive (Ahmed, 1993). Ahmed (1993) contends that this type of investment cost is the 
easiest to recover from users. Without this public investment, scattered roadside shops and 
periodic markets become a common feature . Irregular roadside markets are inefficient in 
exchanging market information. Thus, public investment in development of marketplaces within 
the communal areas with new or improved infrastructure is essential for the growth of 
marketplaces and exchange centres. Any formulation of rules for the conduct of these 
marketplaces should ensure that there is no restriction on movement, no exploitative local taxes 
on traders, and that there is adjudication readily in place to resolve trade disputes (Ahmed, 1993). 
Ideally, infrastructural development is supposed to promote an environment for the healthy 
growth of private entrepreneurship so that the public sector need not enter into direct production 
and marketing. Infrastructure, particularly transport infrastructure, is meant to increase mobility 
of goods, knowledge and people. Once infrastructural development is achieved, future research 
can focus on its effects on market development, agricultural production, household income 
(particularly from nonagricultural sources), employment, consumption and buying patterns, 
savings and investment behaviour. Moreover, the interaction between physical infrastructure and 
26 
institutional and technological development can be assessed (Ahmed, 1993). 
1.5.2 Market access 
Apart from the physical infrastructure that a marketing system requires, institutional infrastructure 
is of major importance in order to lower transaction costs. The role ofthe state in establishing that 
framework is essential. A set of rules and conventions that structures the actions of market 
participants has to be in place for an efficient marketing system. Shaffer (1980) identified four 
requirements of a regulatory framework for a decentralized market system to function: 
(1) A set of "ordered relations" between economic agents established by legal and social 
conventions that define and allocate property rights, entitlements, and delineate the legitimate 
scope of economic behaviour. 
(2) Rules about transactions between economic individuals that define rights to exchange property 
rights, define what may constitute legitimate contracts, permissible and non-permissible forms of 
cooperation and competition, and establish rules on liability. 
(3) A system of authority and legitimacy to enforce these rules, including penalties for 
delinquency. 
(4) Mechanisms by which these rules can be adapted to changing economIc and social 
circumstances while providing a predictable framework for market participants. 
Collective activity by small-scale farmers in the communal areas ofKwaZulu-Natal is limited and 
appears to be confined to non-marketing (i .e. production) related operations . There are no 
support services for marketing of food crops. Market access policies for small farmers should 
consider four key factors to achieve expected results namely, improvements in access to assets, 
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information, services and profitable markets. These would facilitate market participation by small-
scale farmers in less developed countries or regions (Delgado, 1999). 
Table 1.1 shows the four key factors suggested by Delgado (1999) to facilitate market 
participation. The transfer of resources to resource-limited small and poor farmers as well as 
access to technical and market information are important to promote market participation by these 
farmers . Delgado (1999) contends that incentives should be created to allow information or 
management-rich individuals to share their expertise with small-scale and poor farmers. Access 
to services and profitable markets is also a further step in the promotion of market participation. 
The institutional framework and infrastructural factors (roads, market places, telecommunication) 
affect the level of access to institutional resources and services, which in turn can prevent the 
development of competitive market conditions (Kormawa and Von Oppen,] 997) . 
Table 1.1 Important factors in increasing small farmers' market participation in Sub-
Saharan Africa and their organizational requirements. 
Access to Assets 
Because of asset-deficit situation smallholders find themselves, it is sometimes necessary to 
make a net transfer (such as a cow) in order to stimulate entry into agriculture. 
Access to Information 
It is also important that smallholders be supported in acquiring production, marketing 
information and management skills. 
Access to Services 
Because of poor infrastructure and the unequal distribution of services, the implementation 
of institutions to share the risk of service delivery to smallholders and to overcome other 
economies of scale in production is needed . 
Access to Remunerative Markets 
To promote growth of small-scale agriculture, it is important that small-scare farmers have 
access to profitable markets for high-value items. 
Source: Delgado (1999) 
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In order to succeed, small-scale farmers must access local and regional markets to satisfy needs 
which are not met by the large-scale food and feed supply networks (Bragg, 1996). This section 
presents a few alternatives which, if considered, may improve market access for these emerging 
farmers . Small-scale farmers in rural areas generally do not have the production volumes needed 
to use advanced packing and handling techniques and find it difficult to access large markets. The 
importance of a strategic plan is therefore crucial for the survival of emerging farmers . Only three 
alternatives are introduced here, namely farmers ' markets (market places), public markets and 
marketing associations. 
1.5.2.1 Farmers' markets (market places) 
A farmers' market is defined as a common facility or area where several farmers or growers 
gather on a regular basis to sell a variety of fresh fruits and vegetables and other farm products 
directly to consumers (Bragg, 1996). This type of setting would give consumers (or private 
traders) direct access to fresh fruits and vegetables and other farm products and at the same time 
provide independent farmers with a profitable sales outlet for their production. Prevalent in most 
rural areas of the United States, this setting may also contribute to community development and 
build up community spirit and empowerment (Bragg, ] 996) . 
A physical market place can also be a supermarket for ideas, information, and resources for rural 
economic development. According to Harriss-White (1999) market places and staple food 
markets are highly gendered complexes of social institutions. In West Africa, for example, while 
agricultural production may be controlled by both women and men, local trade in basic 
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consumption goods has been widely observed as public domain for women, in which not only can 
competition be fierce but also accumulation possible. He explains that various arguments have 
been put forward for this situation such as compatibility and cultural. 
1.5.2.2 Public markets 
Public markets are defined as groups of locally-owned, mainly owner-operated private retail 
businesses leasing or renting space in a shared facility on a permanent basis with an emphasis on 
the sale of fresh foods (Bragg, 1996). Private businesses operating in these types of premises may 
trade in produce such as meats, poultry, fish and seafood, eggs, baked goods, ready-to-eat 
traditional foods and other related items. A combination of government (local or national) and 
private funds could be used to construct or renovate this type of market place setting. 
1.5.2.3 Marketing associations 
These can be considered as groups where emerging farmers can collectively assemble sufficient 
product volumes to attract buyers for needed shipment to nearby towns (Bragg, 1996). These 
types of groupings, therefore, can become a source of direct supply for local or nearby towns ' 
grocers and food service operators. Operations that can be undertaken by this type of institution 
(packing, cooling, sorting, grading, etc.) are still a critical process in the survival of small-scale 
emerging farmers to access the wider markets (Bragg, 1996). A marketing association should 
provide timely, accurate and unbiased market information to buyers and sellers of agricultural 
commodities. 
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In line with marketing associations, after periods of dissatisfaction, village-level cooperatives are 
resurgent, as a means of offsetting liquidity constraints, information asymmetries, and minimum 
efficient scales of production or marketing that can prevent small-scale farmers participation in 
rapidly agrifood sectors (Holloway, et at. 2000). Marketing associations such as cooperative sales 
organizations among resource-limited farmers have shown to possess the potential of stimulating 
market participation among dairy producers in peri-urban settings (Holloway, et at. 2000) . These 
cooperatives, run by member-farmers are very helpful in overcoming access to barriers to assets, 
information, services and the markets to sell high-value items. 
This is a form of collective action that addresses access problems whereby, participant member-
farmers can handle input purchasing and distribution and output marketing. Farmers not only gain 
the benefit of assured supplies of the right input at the right time, sometimes on credit against 
output deliveries, and an assured market for the output, but also can be applied equally to all 
farmers in a given location and time period. Moreover, producer cooperatives can offer 
processors/marketers the advantage of an assured supply of the commodity at known intervals 
at a fixed price and a controlled quality. Extension can also be part of the services provided 
sometimes better than state extension services (Holloway, et al. 2000) . 
In addition to the above-mentioned forms of farmers ' orgaruzations, farmers in the two study 
areas could benefit by linking to a processor, hospital , school, church, or marketer by way of a 
contract. Widespread contract farming have been emerging in many developing countries, as a 
means to reduce risk and ensure volumes of known price and quality for downstream processors 
and distributors (Ghandi et a1.2000; Jaffee and Morton, 1995). Contract farming provides some 
of the most lucrative opporturuties available to small farmers throughout Africa (Jaffee and 
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Morton, 1995; Grosh, 1994). With this kind of arrangement, small farmers producing high value 
items could overcome problems related to access to assets, information, services and markets. 
However, despite reducing coordination costs within the agrifood chain, there is growing 
evidence that contracts may not suit the small-scale farmers as far as agroindustrialization is 
concerned. Further research with respect to communal farmers in KwaZulu-Natal and South 
Africa could assess mechanisms by which contract farming schemes can be initiated . Equity-
sharing schemes with the private sector can also improve agricultural performance in the 
communal areas. The establishment of such schemes has provided an alternative form of access 
to finance and markets, management and business skills for new farmers (McKenzie, 1993). 
Furthermore, electronic commerce offers unprecedented opportunities for farmers and more 
broadly for rural areas. For rural areas remote from large centres of population, electronic 
commerce provides a means for increasing market size and hence commercial viability, at least 
in developed nations (Blandford and Fulponi, 1998). This, however, does not exclude small-scale 
farmers in the developing world of getting involved, if the necessary infrastructure, particularly 
for transport and telecommunications, is available. With e-commerce, transaction costs, 
particularly transportation costs, are reduced since there is no necessity that goods and their 
buyers and sellers be physically present at a given location in order to make a transaction 
(Blandford and Fulponi, 1998). However, requirements to participate in this new form of 
marketing include computer-literate farmers and a connection to the network on which the virtual 
market exists. 
In conclusion, the transition from subsistence agriculture to full commercial farming would occur 
only when risk is relatively small , transaction costs are low, and marketing procedures are 
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relatively easy. Infrastructural development critically influences all these factors . Development 
policies must give the economy the tools and infrastructure it needs to sustain growth and 
prosperity in the communal areas of South Africa. A sound physical infrastructure (improved 
roads and bridaes telecommunications) and a better institutional environment (contract /;) , 
enforcement, safety and security) in these areas will bring economic opportunities. Non "public 
goods"activities, such as the procurement of seeds, transport, storage and distribution, can be 
most efficiently carried out by the private sector, whereas those with a "public goods"nature -
such as providing an "enabling environment for the development of an efficient private marketing 
system, ensuring competition, the provision of public infrastructure, such as roads and public 
markets, a strong legal system for the settlement of trade disputes - are better carried out by the 
state (Coulter 1994). 
Besides creating a facilitating environment where private trade can function efficiently, and 
providing for functions that cannot be entrusted to the private sector, the state sometimes can 
provide direct assistance to farmers, traders and other parties involved in the marketing of 
agricultural products . This direct assistance can be in areas such as market information, technical 
assistance in crop storage, provision of small-scale milling equipment, and marketing credit to 
farmers and traders. The state is the means whereby the rights to exchange property rights, rules 
about liability and penalty for delinquency, and conventions about trade activities are guaranteed 
(Coulter, 1994). 
Thus, the purpose of the New Institutional Economics is both to explain the operation of 
institutions and their evolution over time, and to evaluate their significant influence on economic 
performance, efficiency, and distribution . There is a two-way causality between institutions and 
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economic growth. On the one hand, institutions have a profound influence on economic growth, 
and on the other hand, economic growth and development often result in a change in institutions. 
The next chapter takes a closer look at Transaction Cost Economics and its application to 
developing agriculture . 
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CHAPTER 2 
SMALL-SCALE FARMERS' MARKET PARTICIPATION UNDER TRANSACTION 
COSTS 
Agricultural marketing is intimately linked with the process of economic development, which rests 
on the specialisation of production for sale to others. The extent of specialisation depends on an 
exchange economy, but the rate at which an exchange economy emerges depends on the 
performance of its marketing system (Warley, 1967). As in the rest of the developing world, 
increased production and marketing has the potential in much of Mrica to generate income and 
employment on a wide scale, and thus to improve the welfare of populations on an economically 
sustainable basis (Walshe et aI. , 1991). In sub-Saharan Mrica, smallholder agriculture still 
accounts for the majority oflivelihoods, yet has been subjected in recent years to increasing strains 
as a viable source of income generation because of high transaction costs and land pressure (Staal 
et a/. , 1996). Coase (1937, 1960) studied the costs involved in human interaction and explained 
the reasons for the existence of firms (1937) and the conditions under which the allocative 
implications of microeconomic theory are held (1960). But the study of transaction costs, in 
addition to giving insights into static economic analysis, also holds the key to unlocking the doors 
to an improved understanding of economic and societal performance through time (North, 1997). 
This study hypothesizes that growth in small-scale agriculture is limited by high transaction costs 
in both production and marketing of products by emerging small-scale farmers. Understanding 
the nature of these constraints and how they can be alleviated is central to using small-scale 
agricultural development as a tool to improve rural livelihoods (Delgado,1996). Inadequate 
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access to market information and technology, poor physical and institutional infrastructure are the 
main determinants of the higher fixed transaction costs per unit faced by small-scale farmers in 
most former homelands of South Africa. 
Transaction costs include, among others, the costs of searching for a partner with whom to 
exchange, screening potential trading partners to ascertain their trustworthiness, bargaining with 
potential partners (and in some cases, officials who can hold up trade) to reach an agreement, 
transferring the product (this typically involves transportation, processing, packaging, and 
securing title, if necessary), monitoring the agreement to see that its conditions are fulfilled , and 
enforcing (or seeking damages for any violation of) the exchange agreement (Staal et at. , 1996) . 
Transaction costs, therefore, help explain why aggregate agricultural supply response to relative 
price changes is often quite slow in Africa (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1994). The notion that the 
costs of arranging exchange may reduce or even prevent exchanges from occurring, and may give 
rise to institutions and organizations to offset their negative impacts, is now widely accepted 
(Williamson, 1985). Because any transaction or deal is posed in term of a contracting problem, 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) can be used to shed light on a wide range of economic and 
non-economic arrangements . TCE has been applied to many areas, including industrial 
organization, corporate governance, labour economics, public choice, development, and economic 
history. Not only has TCE had numerous applications, but new uses continue to appear 
(Williamson and Masten, 1999). 
Generally, economic data series focus on prices and quantities. TCE, in contrast, requires detailed 
information on organizational form as well as on attributes of transactions such as the level of 
uncertainty associated with exchange, the complexity of products and processes, and the extent 
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to which assets needed for production are specific to a particular relationship. For the most part, 
transaction cost economists have had to use surveys, regulatory and business archives in order to 
assess a given phenomenon (Williamson and Masten, 1999). This chapter presents the Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) theory approach and its application to developing agriculture. 
2.1 THE THEORY OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
Pitelis (1993) states that a renewal of interest in institutions and a reaffirmation of their economic 
importance can be traced to the early 1960 ls with Coase' s (1960) study on social costs, Alchian ' s 
(1961) analysis of property rights and Arrow's (1984) work on the economic properties of 
information . The basic characteristic of the new line of research is that the concept of a firm as 
production unit is augmented by the concept of a firm as governance structure (Pitelis, 1993). 
TCE is part of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) research tradition, and applies to the study 
of economic organization of all kind (capitalism, socialism, etc.). 
Research based on the NIE approach became very popular by 1975, as was discussed in the last 
chapter. Many ofthe articles in the Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, which first 
began publication in 1980, are in the new institutionalist spirit (Williamson, 1985,J For raising 
the issue of costs, Coase (1937) is considered to be the founder of the NIE. Coase (1960) sees 
the issue of firms, law and the state as major institutional devices in market economies. In this 
way, he has also been responsible for the multi-institutionalism phase of economic analysis. 
Today, the list could be extended to include, among others, the family, norms and customs, clan, 
associations and even religion. Coase ' s award of the 1991 Nobel Prize in economics confirms the 
profession's recognition of his contribution (Pitelis, 1993). 
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An accurate assessment of the eoonomic institutions of capitalism cannot be reached if the central 
importance of transaction cost economics is denied . That is, a balanced view of the economic 
institutions of capitalism will need more attention to the sociology of economic organization. In 
short, the basic principle underlying TeE is that economic institutions will develop to minimize 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985a) . But this may not happen due to high transaction costs and 
political resistance (Lyne et al. , 1997:64). 
Dow (1993) summarizes the analytic theory of TeE as follows : A transaction requires that the 
members of a group carry out actions . The resulting gains will vary with the actions taken by 
individual agents. Some of these actions are in form of contracts and a third party (i . e. state) is 
able and must enforce agreement on contracts . A governance structure is a binding agreement 
regulating contracts between coalition members, and specifying an authority structure to decide 
actions not explicitly covered in advance. The transaction cost associated with a governance 
structure is the difference between the aggregate surplus generated by that structure and the first-
best surplus level arising in a hypothetical world where agents can contract at lower or no cost 
on all relevant actions . An efficient governance structure (i .e. a structure with minimum 
transaction costs) will be preferred. 
2.2 THE TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS APPROACH 
As an approach, TeE adopts a contracting orientation and states that any issue that can be 
formulated as a contracting problem, can be analysed in transaction cost economizing terms. 
Every exchange relation qualifies. Some issues which at first may appear to lack a contracting 
aspect turn out, upon scrutiny, to have an implicit contracting quality (Williamson, 1987). 
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Furthermore, Williamsom (1987) states that the transaction cost approach draws from both 
economics and organization theory. With this basis, this approach attempts to identify a set of 
market or transactional factors which, together with complex contracts involving contingent 
claims, will be costly to write, execute, and enforce. Faced with such difficulties, and considering 
the risks that simple, and incomplete, contingent claims contracts pose, the firm may decide to 
bypass the market and resort to hierarchical modes of organization. Transactions that might 
otherwise be handled in the market would then be performed internally and governed by 
administered processes. Uncertainty and the number of exchanges in which one party's choice of 
trading partners is restricted, are the transactional factors to which market failure is ascribed. 
However, Dietrich (1994) argues that to base everything just on exchange may generate an 
inadequate specification of the particular nature of the firm. Rather, he suggests, the 
characteristics of the firm also involve the management of a production- distribution process and, 
to remove the exchange-only limitation, organization and transaction costs should be identified 
separately. The former is the cost of running firms rather than the cost of running markets. Having 
identified organization costs, it is then possible to examine the factors underlying their existence. 
Williamson (1985 b) points out that transaction costs are always assessed in a comparative 
institutional way, in which one mode of contracting is compared with another. Accordingly, it is 
the difference between, rather than the absolute magnitude of, transaction costs that matter. This 
approach is adopted because transaction costs are often difficult to quantify; however, Dietrich 
(1994:23) thinks that this difficulty may mask an implicit assumption that alternative governance 
structures are always feasible . 
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TCE poses the problem of economic organization as a problem of contracting. A particular task 
is to be accomplished. It can be organized in any of several alternative ways. Explicit or implicit 
contract and support apparatus are associated with each. What are the costs? Williamsom 
(1985,. :24) gives a scenario of a contracting situation in which he distinguishes two approaches: 
the efficiency and the monopoly approaches . Most of what Williamson (1985 b) refers to as new 
institutional economics is located on the efficiency branch of contracts, which distinguishes 
between those approaches in which incentive aspects are emphasized and those which feature the 
economics of transaction costs. 
The incentive aspect deals with the ex ante side of a contract. New forms of property rights and 
complex contracting are thus interpreted as efforts to overcome the incentive deficiencies of 
simpler property rights and contracting tradition. The property rights part emphasizes that 
ownership matters, where the rights of ownership of an asset take three parts: the right to use the 
asset, the right to appropriate returns from the asset, and the right to change the form and/or 
substance of an asset (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1979). Once the property rights issue is clarified, 
it can be assumed that utilization thereafter will reflect on the purpose of its owners. Williamson 
(1985..) concludes that a successful contracting scheme will be obtained if: (I) the legally 
sanctioned structure of property rights is respected, and (2) human agents discharge their jobs in 
accordance with instructions. 
Dietrich (1994) thinks that it is fairly simple to remove any inconsistency in TCE. All that is 
required is the removal of opportunism as one of its central pillars . A framework can then be 
developed that focuses on bounded rationality and examines the ways that different governance 
structures foster and constrain opportunism and trust. The development of opportunistic or 
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trusting behaviour, he adds, will be dependent, in part, on the extent to which governance 
structures generate convergent perceptions of the society. This is central to understanding the 
nature of organization and the firm, and is also an important factor underlying the development 
of quasi-integration strategies. To some extent, Dietrich (1994) suggests that the elements of such 
a framework are all contained in Williamson' s (1985 a) work. But Dow (1993) believes that TeE 
has had less success in addressing problems of workplace organization and human capital, despite 
some notable attempts . In particular, he argues that Williamson' s writings in this area have 
stimulated much criticism and controversy and this may be in part because of the greater political 
sensitivity of the issues involved . 
2.3 NATURE OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
A fundamental difference between neo-c1assical, neo-Marxist, and new institutional analysis 
regards the relative merits of exchange (Ensminger, 1992). While neo-classical economists are 
inclined to believe that the benefits of exchange outweigh the costs, Marxists (especially 
dependency theorists) are more inclined to argue that exchange is unequal and therefore 
detrimental to all but the elite in what they call the peripheral nations (Amin, 1976) 
New institutional economists, for their part, would agree with neo-classical economists that 
economic growth stems from the gains from exchange and that these can be realized for both 
sides, but they would not accept that such gains are automatic; to do so would be to ignore 
transaction costs . New institutional economists accept that people may well resist trade as long 
as the costs of exchange are higher than the perceived benefits, and they would also accept the 
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possibility of the Marxist prediction that some may be made worse off as a result of unequal 
distribution of the new benefits (Ensminger, 1992). 
Arrow , the first author to use the term "transaction costs" (Dietrich, 1994: 19), claims that market 
failure is not absolute; it is better to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which 
in general prevent and in certain cases block the formation of markets; such costs are the costs 
of running the economic system. Williamson (1985.,) follows Arrow's (1963) definition of 
transaction costs as the costs of running the economic system, and as such they are equivalent to 
"friction" in the physical sciences. In more detail: ex ante transaction costs are the costs of 
drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement. Ex post transaction costs include: 
1. The costs incurred when transactions drift out of line with the requirements. Suppose that the 
contract stipulates "x " but the parties discover later on that they should have done 'J; ". 
Correcting this situation may not be easy and may involve some costs. 
2. The costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post irregularities. 
3. The set-up and running costs associated with the governance structures to which the disputes 
are referred . 
4. The bonding costs of effectively securing commitments. 
Ex ante and Ex post costs are interdependent and must be dealt with simultaneously rather than 
separately (Williamson, 1985..). 
Williamson (1985..) thinks that the existence of transaction costs depends on three factors : 
bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviour and asset specificity. Opportunistic behaviour 
manifests itself as adverse selection, moral hazard, cheating, shirking, and other forms of strategic 
behaviour. If these three factors are not all present, transaction costs will not exist. Given the 
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existence of contracting problems (that is, the existence of the mentioned three factors), TCE 
should be able to specify the governance structures that can efficiently manage economic 
activities in any situation. 
Dietrich (1994) defines transaction costs in terms of three factors : search and information costs, 
bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs. If attention is restricted to 
firms rather than final consumers, he adds, these factors can be recast in terms of the management 
costs associated with the preparation and enforcement of contracts. This allows transaction costs 
to be viewed as production costs and analysed accordingly. For his part, North (1997) thinks of 
transaction costs as the costs of measuring what is being exchanged and enforcing agreements. 
In the larger context, they are the costs involved in human interaction over time. 
According to Eggerston (1990: 15), transaction costs arise when households exchange ownership 
rights for economic assets and enforce their exclusive rights. These costs include expenses and 
opportunity costs arising from the exchange of property rights, and originate mainly from the 
following activities : 
- Search of market information (i .e prices, quality, partners or customers) . 
- Bargaining with contracting parties 
- Defining contracts guidelines, monitoring and enforcing of the contract. 
Drabenstott (1995) sees transaction costs as perceived risk, transportation, and administrative 
costs while Staal et al (1996) and Delgado (1996) grouped transaction costs into observable and 
inhibitive (i .e. unobservable) . Observable transaction costs include marketing costs such as 
transport, handling, packaging, storage and spoilage. These costs are observable when an 
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exchange takes place. The unobservable transaction costs include the costs of search, bargaining, 
screening, monitoring, co-ordination and enforcement. Delgado (1997) argues that these are the 
costs of participating in the market process, whether or not a market exists . 
Furthermore, Hobbs (1997) classified transaction costs into information, negotiation, and 
monitoring or enforcement costs . Information costs arise ex ante of an exchange and include the 
costs of obtaining price and product information and the costs of identifying a suitable partner. 
Negotiation costs are the costs physically carrying out the transaction and may include 
commission costs, the costs of physically negotiating the terms of an exchange, and the costs of 
formally drawing up contracts . Monitoring or enforcement costs occur ex post of a transaction 
and are the costs of ensuring that the terms of the contract (i . e. quality standards and payment 
arrangements) are respected by the other parties involved in the transaction. 
Zaibet and Dunn (1998) defines transaction costs in terms of risk attitude of farmers and argue 
that these costs include high transport costs due to the distance of the farm from the market, poor 
or non-existent infrastructure, high marketing margins due to monopoly power, and high costs 
of searching and monitoring contracts . Transaction costs also results from information 
inefficiencies and institutional constraints, such as the absence of formal markets . The presence 
of transaction costs is often reflected by the discrepancy between perceived buying and selling 
prices (De Janvry et al. 1991). When these discrepancies occur, sellers experience low selling 
price and consequently discouraged to sell, while buyers experiencing high buying price, become 
discouraged to buy. 
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Recently, Key et al. (2000) distinguished between proportional and fixed transaction costs. 
Proportional transaction costs vary with the level of, or the amount involved in, the transaction 
whereas fixed transaction costs are the same regardless of the level of transaction made. 
The limited empirical evidence on the nature and importance of transaction costs is due to a 
number of conceptual and measurement difficulties (Staal et al. 1996). Firstly, when transaction 
costs are high enough to prevent exchange from occurring, by definition the costs cannot be 
observed because no transaction exists . Costs associated with organizing and enforcing 
institutions of exchange are often difficult to document. Also, an accurate assessment of 
observable transaction costs and their behavioural implications imply a significant commitment 
of resources for data collection. This is due to the need to examine all agents (not only 
producers), in what is often diverse marketing channels, simultaneously and for a period of time 
sufficient to capture inter- seasonal variation in costs and marketing decisions. 
Most existing studies dealing empirically with transaction costs have instead attempted to infer 
the magnitude of transaction costs, based on the observed behaviour of participating and non-
participating agents in the marketing channels (Goetz, 1992). The magnitude and impacts of 
transaction costs can also be inferred from the marketing behaviour of producers of various sizes 
in different locations (Debrah and Anteneh, 199 1). Comprehensive analyses on the impact of 
transaction costs on the use ofland and credit by the small-scale farmers in the former KwaZulu 
homeland show the importance of these costs (Thomson, 1996). The present study would 
supplement those analyses by investigating transaction costs in marketing for emerging farmers 
in the region . 
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In the absence of direct estimates of the transaction costs incurred by economic agents in the 
marketing chain, discussion can centre on the indirect evidence of the nature and behavioural 
implications oftransaction costs . The guiding hypothesis is that the influence oftransaction costs 
can be explored through differences in observed marketing costs, marketing channels used, costs 
of inputs (including the capital necessary for entry), and prices received for their agricultural 
products . The role of organization in reducing transaction costs is explored through differences 
in the prevalence of co-operatives (or other provisions), and resultant differences in marketing 
patterns (Staal et aI. , 1996). 
Coase (1960) concludes that the neo-classical paradigm will yield its predictive results only in the 
absence of transaction costs. Every trade agreement involves a contract that must be defined and 
enforced. The costs of defining and enforcing contracts are what constitute transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are therefore important as they determine which type of contracts will be 
entered into, or whether costs may preclude contracting. In order for goods to be exchanged and 
realize their highest market value, the property rights to the goods must be well defined. A clear 
definition of property rights therefore reduces transaction costs by creating certainty in exchange 
of the goods. However, the process of defining and enforcing a property rights system is not 
without costs (Thomson, 1996). 
The nature of transaction costs renders a full accounting of their characteristics and impacts 
difficult. Yet, opportunities exist to better document transaction costs that are in principle 
observable (Delgado and Siamwalla, 1997). These observable transaction costs include: the 
opportunity costs of time spent by producers in marketing, direct transportation and processing 
costs, losses due to spoilage resulting from uncertain market outlets, and the degree to which 
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market outlets used by producers change over time (resulting in additional search costs). A non-
exhaustive list of relevant transaction costs affecting the exchange of agricultural products in 
developing countries is (Hoff et ai. , 1993) : 
- Spoilage, 
- Quality differences depending on processing, 
- Lumpiness of initial investments, 
- Lags in production, 
- Seasonal variability, 
- Search costs, 
- Screening trade partners, 
- Bargaining, 
- Monitoring, 
- Contract enforcement. 
In addition, location issues such as transport, handling, packaging and temporal costs (such as 
storage) should be included (Delgado and Siamwalla,1997). 
Simon (1978) observes that the comparison of two different marketing structures can be rather 
simple. This can be done without any mathematical demonstrations or calculations. In general, the 
right arguments will be enough to demonstrate the difference between two quantities using 
different market venues in dealing with transaction costs. Empirical research on transaction costs 
almost never attempts to measure such costs directly. Instead, the question is whether 
organizational relations (contracting practices, governance structures) line up with the attributes 
of transactions as predicted by transaction cost reasoning or not. However, Goetz (1992) suggests 
that a selectivity model can be used in which households are switched into alternative market 
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participation states (those who engage in commercial agriculture versus those who stay out) . 
Failure to participate in markets results from high fixed transaction costs. He suggests the use of 
multivariate statistical techniques to distinguish between two or more groups of cases. 
2.4 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN 
RURAL KWAZULU-NATAL. 
This section briefly reviews the historical development of institutions in the province in order to 
understand the dimensions of transaction costs faced by communal farmers in rural K waZulu-
Natal. At present much-needed infrastructure developments (such as electricity, water and 
telecommunication services) are being undertaken in the communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal. 
However, the province's fragmented institutional structure needs to be understood in terms of the 
historical development of the present system (Harrison, 1993; Forsyth, 1995). As a result of the 
1910 Act of Union, the area now known as KwaZulu-Natal was constituted as a province (Natal), 
and a separate black homeland (KwaZulu) within the Union of South Africa. After 1948, attempts 
at making black homelands "independent" of South Africa resulted in the creation of the self-
governing territory of KwaZulu in 1972. The province of Natal (part of the Republic of South 
Africa) and the self-governing territory of KwaZulu coexisted until the formation of the 
Government of National Unity in 1994. In terms of the interim constitution, KwaZulu and Natal 
were united as the present province ofKwaZulu-Natal. 
While the rural areas of Natal were relatively well served by an adequately funded and staffed 
provincial administration during the period 1972-94, the same could not be said for the self-
governing territory of K waZulu, which had little institutional capacity and so lacked the means 
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to be truly independent of the South African state (Barnes and Morris, 1997). Some attempts were 
made to resolve problems resulting from territorial segregation under apartheid . A number of 
multilateral and coordinatory structures such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa and 
regional advisory committees were set up in the 1980's and early 1990's. Further initiatives for 
Natal and K waZulu included the establishment of a Joint Executive Authority (JEA) in 1987 and 
Joint Services Boards (JSB) in 1990. 
However, these attempts at transcending apartheid boundaries were undermined by constitutional 
changes which served to further fragment the country' s institutional environment, and even more 
importantly, South African society (Barnes and Morris, 1997). Although the 1980's and early 
1990's did see an increase in the number of development organisations in rural KwaZulu and 
Natal, the manner in which they were constituted, and the institutional environment in which they 
found themselves, ensured their failure as viable development mechanisms owing to the large 
number of organisations and their overlapping responsibilities. The direct result of such a 
confused and complex institutional environment in the province was the undermining of 
development initiatives, particularly in rural areas (Barnes and Morris, 1997). 
Barnes and Morris (1997) argue that many of the major service-oriented development 
organisations in the province are still experiencing the same problems they experienced during the 
apartheid era. Apartheid-based legislation in South Africa has left rural KwaZulu-Natal with an 
extremely complex and inefficient institutional environment. It failed in terms of efficiency, 
adaptability, transparency and equitability for the following reasons(Barnes and Morris, 1997): 
- no clear policy parameters defining organizational responsibility existed within the province; 
- no autonomous tier of local government existed; 
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- the traditional authority question remained unresolved; 
- there were parallel service delivery structures; 
_ community participation in service delivery was poorly coordinated and to some extent rural 
violence also undermined service delivery. 
Still, as Harrison (1993) pointed out, despite these shortcomings, a window of opportunity exists, 
a chance to take what is good from the old, and create whatever else is needed to ensure a new, 
far more efficient institutional environment for KwaZulu-Natal. 
2.5 MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD MARKET PARTICIPATION UNDER TRANSACTION 
COSTS 
Two important empirical models developed by Key et al.(2000) and Goetz (1992) inspired the 
. specification model of the present study. It is, however important to note that while the two 
models have the decision on whether to participate or not in markets (and if so how?) as their 
focus, the scope of the present study is limited to identifying strategic transaction cost/household 
characteristics affecting the depth and quality of marketing channels used which, in turn, 
determine the level of crop income generated by participating communal farmers in the study 
areas. 
A typical farm household model framework incorporating transaction costs was developed by Key 
et al. (2000 :246-250) . The model specified market participation as a choice variable so that 
besides the decision on how much of each good CO to consume (c) , produce (q) , and use as an 
input (~), the household would also decide on how much of each product to sell (Ill;) , where Ill; 
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is positive when it is a sale and negative otherwise. In the absence of transaction costs, the 
household ' s objective is to maximise the utility function (1) subject to (2)-(5) : 
N 
L Pi n1mj + T = 0 (2) 
i= 1 
q. - X · + A. - m· - C· = 0, i = 1, ... , N (3) l l 1 I I 
G(q,x;Zq) = 0 (4) 
ci,qiXj ~ 0 (5) 
where Pim represents the market price of product i , A; is an inventory in good i , T is the 
exogenous transfers (i.e. welfare or disability payments) and other incomes, Zu and Zq represent 
exogenous shifters in utility and production, respectively, while G is the production technology. 
The full income constraint (2) indicates that consumption can only be equal to or less ( :$; ) than the 
value of production and transfers . The resource balance equation (3) shows that for each of the 
product N goods, the quantity consumed, used as input, and sold should be equal to what is 
produced and bought and the endowment of the product. The production technology equation 
(4) identifies inputs with outputs. However, when factors reflecting both variable and fixed 





where the household pays the fixed transaction cost t/ if it sells good i , and pays t./ if it buys it. 
6j' is equal to one if m, > 0 and zero otherwise, and 6/ is equal to one if m, < 0 and zero otherwise. 
The price received by the seller is lower than the market price p/" by the unobservable amount tv,", 
and the price paid by the buyer is greater than p/" by the unobservable amount t} . Both variable 
(tv) and fixed (tft) transaction costs are generally unobservable, though, exogenous factors, z(s and 
Z(b can be observed to explain these costs when selling and buying, respectively. Therefore, with 
both types of transaction costs, the household problem can be expressed by equations (1) and (3)-
(6) . Transaction costs increase the price paid by a buyer and decrease the price received by a 











Figure 2.1 Market participation under transaction costs. 
Source: Adapted and Simplified from Key et al (2000) 
The rationality behind transaction cost theory is that transaction costs determine where products 
are sold and at what price. This in turn determines the volume of traded outputs. Figure 2.1 
describes the expected effects of transaction costs on producer and consumer prices and the 
subsequent effect on the quantity of goods exchanged . The existence of transaction costs will 
lower the price received by a seller, thus discouraging market participation on the one hand . On 
the other hand, transaction costs raise the effective value of production consumed by the 
household, resulting in a higher level of own consumption and a lower level of market 
participation. 
Transaction costs include, among other, transportation and marketing costs that may be 
unobservable or cannot be easily recorded (Key et at. 2000). Equations 3 - 6 show that 
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transaction costs do not exist for non-participating households, and fixed transaction costs (tft) will 
determine whether the household participates or not. Furthermore, conditional on market 
participation, the supply and demand equations for a household facing both variable and fixed 
transaction costs can be derived by defining the Lagrangian: 
N 
+ I j.1( qi - Xi + ~ - mi - ci ) 
i = 1 
where f.1, cp , and A are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the resource balance, the 
technology constraint, and the income constraint, respectively. Fixed transaction costs would 
create discontinuities in the Lagrangian; therefore, in order to find the optimal solution, Key et 
al.(2000) suggest a two-step solution. Firstly, conditional on market participation, the optimal 
solution is solved for, and then the depth of participation which leads to the highest level of utility 
is chosen. 
Once transaction costs are specified as constraints, it is possible to obtain the conditional optimal 
supply and demand for that constraint by solving for the first order conditions, which are: 
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For consumed goods: 
OU 




f-Li + ¢ &j i = 0, i E {ilqj > O} (8) 
For inputs 
OG 
i E {ijXi > o} (9) - f-Li + ¢ ex. = 0 
I 
F or marketed goods: 
_ + ,,1,[( m _ t S )8.'~ + (pm + tb )5b ] = 0 f-LI PI VI I I VI I 
i E {ilmi to}. (10) 
The decision price Pi is defined as : 
Pm - t
S 1if m. > 0, seller 
I VI I 
Pi = p;1 + t~i if mi < 0, buyer 
p = ~ if mi = 0, self - sufficient . 
P, is the unobservable internal shadow price fJ-i fA when the household does not trade produced 
goods, and when goods are traded, the household 's decision price will include variable transaction 
costs. Using the decision price Pi defined above, the first order conditions (7) to (10) are the same 
as those resulting from the separable producer and consumer problems. From here it is possible 
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to establish the conditions which determine the market participation of a household facing variable 
and fixed transaction costs. Market participation is determined by comparing the utility obtained 
from selling, buying, and remaining self-sufficient. The corresponding functional relations for 
output supply under transaction costs are given by: 
1. ifq(pm - t:,Zq» qS(t;, zq,zu,T,A), 
then output supply for a seller household is: 
qS = q(pm _ t:,Zq) 
2. ifq(pll1 - t:,Zq) ~ qS(t;, zq,zu,T,A) and 
q(pln + t:,Zq)~ qb(t;,zq,zu, T,A), 
then output supply for self sufficient household is: 
qa = (p,Zq) 
with 15 defined by 
c+x-A=q 
3. ifq(pl11 + t:,Zq)< qb(t;,zq, zu,T,A), 
then output supply for a buyer household is: 
qb = q(pm + t: ,Zq) 
Aggregate supply will respond to changes in the transaction cost structure through its effect on 
market participation; therefore, policies that reduce these costs are important complements to 
price policies in affecting supply response (Key et al. 2000). Consequently, transaction costs have 
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been used to explain why a market might be missing, for instance, in land markets (Carter and 
Mesbah, 1993; Thompson, 1996), in product markets (Stiglitz, 1998) and in credit markets (Besley, 
1994). As a result of these market failures, alternative institutional arrangements (Delgado, 1999) 
such as sharecropping, interlinking and interlocking of markets are initiated (Biswanger et at. , 
1993). 
2.6 REVIEW OF RELATED EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Various studies have dealt with the impact of transaction costs on market (i.e. outputs, inputs, 
credit) participation by farmers in developed and developing countries. According to Hirsh et al. 
(1996), there are two main approaches to studying transaction costs. First, as explanatory 
(independent) variables explaining the behaviour of a certain production unit or firm, as 
prescribed by Williamson (1985 .. ), and secondly as a response variable affected by various factors, 
as explained by North (1997) . Given the nature of transaction costs (sometimes unobservable), 
many studies dealing with these costs use household characteristics to assess their impact. This 
is possible because market failure is household-specific (Goetz,1992) as well as commodity 
specific (Delgado,1999). Transaction costs revolve around market information and the 
institutional setting around it. These costs are thus associated with the lack of, or access to, 
various sources (i .e. formal or informal) of market information. 
A detailed review of the research and studies on the effect and impact of transaction costs on 
households and the subsequent institutions adopted to lower them shows mixed results . This may 
be explained by the nature of transaction costs under investigation. On the basis of the existing 
research, however, it is evident that market participation that ultimately determines the level of 
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income generated from trade is influenced by various factors, including physical and institutional 
infrastructure, and household characteristics. Their effects may be positive or negative, and the 
actual level of income generated will depend on the level of transaction costs faced by a 
household . A number of studies abroad and in South Africa show the relevance of this subject for 
the market integration of resource-limited subsistence farmers in order to uplift rural standards. 
Transaction costs are dominant in input and output markets, whether the focus is on capital 
(credit), fertiliser or adoption of technology, land or labour, marketing channels or market 
information. Generally, ownership of assets and access to market outlets influence the 
participation in such markets . 
In many or probably most developing countries, smallholders account for the bulk of agricultural 
production and make up the largest segment of the rural population (Ruthenberg, 1985). The two 
main features that small farms in the tropics have in common are: 
1. For the most part, the agricultural work is carried out by the family rather than by hired labour. 
2. A large part of the subsistence requirements of the family are met directly from production on 
the farm . 
These characteristics, combined with generally low levels of productivity, the absence of modern 
forms of mechanization and the low degree of specialization, imply that the output of small farms 
in the tropics is limited . A small farm in Africa certainly refers to a much smaller unit than what 
is understood by a small farm in Europe or North America (Ruthenberg, 1985). Where there is no 
land scarcity, the lower limit in terms of arable land is determined by the family ' s subsistence 
needs, at the minimum generally between one and two hectares of cultivated land for a family of 
six. The upper limit is determined by family size and the amount of land a man or woman can 
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cultivate at the given technological level (Ruthenberg, 1985). If development is sought in general 
economic terms and in terms of agricultural and food production, it is these small agricultural 
units that have to be mobilized on a massive scale. For the mobilization of this capacity, both 
technical and institutional change are required (Ruthenberg, 1985). 
Marketing studies are primarily geared toward identifying areas for improvement in marketing in 
order to foster economic development. The empirical finding that many households fail to 
participate in markets is explained by transaction costs (De Janvry and Sadoulet,1994). These 
costs drive a wedge between household buying and selling prices, which is based on the concept 
of nontraded goods (Goetz, 1992). 
Dealing with financial constraints and access to credit by small-scale farmers, Ahmed (1989) 
compared transaction costs of borrowing from formal and informal sources in rural Bangladesh. 
The study showed that transaction costs resulting from loans from formal lenders were higher than 
those of loans from informal lenders. The study concluded that transaction costs per unit of loan 
decrease with loan size, and that this was much faster for formal than informal loans. These 
conclusions agree with the findings of Cuevas and Graham (1986) and Chung (1993) in which 
borrower transaction costs were found to be the primary reason in the choice of credit sources 
by farmers. Similar observations were also made in the study of the informal finance sector in 
Malawi (Chip eta and Mkandawire, 1996). 
Other studies looked at the use of fertilizer, mechanisation and labour. Zaibet and Dunn (1998) 
used size and ownership ofland, number of plots, district location, and existence of annual crops 
as proxies for transaction costs. Their study investigated the assumption that larger family 
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ownership systems, as opposed to restricted family ownership systems, and farm size are the main 
factors for increased risk aversion and transaction costs in market participation. The study found 
that only the nuclear family had a significant and positive correlation with the purchase of 
fertilisers. With respect to mechanisation and labour hiring, the estimate of ownership was positive 
but not significant. A large farm size was found to be significantly and positively correlated to 
mechanisation and labour use. According to Strasberg et al. (1999), the use of fertiliser nutrients 
depended mainly on the distance to tarred road, assets such as the value of agricultural equipment 
owned, value of the livestock owned, and human resource factors. 
Some studies have examined the effect of transaction costs on output markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Goetz,1992; Omamo,1998; Key et al. 2000; Gabre-Madhin,1999; Staal et al.1996; 
Holloway et al. 2000). Goetz (1992) studied household grain marketing behaviour in Senegal by 
separating the decision of whether or not to participate in markets from the decision of how much 
to sell or buy, conditional on participation. The study identified important variables reflecting 
transaction costs which affected coarse grain marketing behaviour of rural households in Senegal. 
Fixed transaction cost proxies included, among others, variables such as the ownership of a cart for 
transporting goods to the market, physical distance from market, ethnicity and age ofthe household 
head. The study found that the probability of buying, and the quantity bought and sold were 
influenced by the grain price. However, other factors, such as better market information, 
significantly raised the probability of market participation of selling households, while access to 
coarse grain processing technology significantly increased quantities sold by sellers. In regions with 
thin markets, it is costly (time consuming) to discover trading opportunities. Similarly, poor market 
access due to lack of transport, distance, and barriers such as ethnicity and languages, increase a 
household's cost of observing market prices to make transaction decisions (Goetz, 1992). 
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Adopting the same line of investigation as Goetz, Key et al. (2000) evaluated market participation 
for maize in Mexico . Fixed and proportional transaction costs were found to playa significant role 
in explaining household decisions. The proportional transaction costs were more determinant in 
the selling rather than the buying decisions, with selling through official outlets significantly 
increasing the production and selling capacity for the sellers. The study also showed that the 
ownership of a pick-up truck was associated with a lower production threshold, implying that 
ownership of assets tends to reduce entry obstacles into the market. 
Holloway et al.(2000) sought to identify various techniques for an effective participation by peri-
urban milk producers in the Ethiopian highlands. Their findings suggested that in order to promote 
entry into the market, institutional innovation should be accompanied by a mix of various factors, 
including improved physical infrastructure, knowledge and market information, and asset 
accumulation in the household. In addition, they found that by locating potential buyers, the time 
required to market milk could be minimised, thus increasing the number of participating producers 
and the level of marketable surplus. These findings are in line with Staal et al. (1996), who 
showed that transaction costs increase with distance, most likely faster than could be expected 
from simple transportation costs. This is caused by the increased costs of information, and risk 
of wastage or spoilage when a buyer is not found in time. 
Staal et al.(2000) used GIS-derived variables for distance and transport costs together with 
survey-derived variables for household characteristics to model market participation and the 
formation offarm-level milk prices. Differences were made between the effects of roads by type 
and distance which pointed to the importance of milk production density and the state of market 
infrastructure. 
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A transaction cost approach was also used by Omamo (1998) in determining that households 
devoted their resources to low-yielding food crops than to cash crops with higher market returns 
in the Siaya district of Kenya. The results indicated that transport costs were the main 
determinants in the cropping and selling choice whereby relatively more land is devoted to cash 
crops and less to food crops when the households are closer to markets. Similar results were also 
found by Fafchamps (1992) when investigating food price volatility and rural market integration. 
The study concluded that while better roads and transportation seemed to equalise price 
movements across a larger regional market, the food prices was increasingly dissociated from 
local supply and demand conditions. In addition, Minot (1999) found that transaction costs, 
especially transportation costs, not only decreased market surplus but also substantially reduced 
the elasticity of supply and demand. 
The transaction costs approach was also applied in the choice of marketing channels in rural 
England (Hobbs, 1997). The study reported that transaction cost variables, including grade 
uncertainty, risk of not selling, and time spent at auction, were the important factors determining 
the choice of either live-ring auction or direct-to-packer sales. For his part, Gabre-Madhin (1999) 
assessed the output markets by investigating at the transaction cost factors which determined the 
choice of market institutions, such as grain brokers in Ethiopia. Traders first determined where 
to trade and then chose whether to use a broker to search for customers. The study concluded 
that high transaction costs shown by traders' individual rationality in selecting brokerage was 
linked to increased broker use, while high social capital reduced the use of brokers . Fafchamps 
and Minten (200 1) analysed property rights in the Malagasy flea market, and found that social 
capital or networks played an important role in the resolution of dispute among traders, implying 
that trust-based relationships were the dominant contract enforcement mechanism among them. 
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Minten (1995) examined the price transmission and transaction costs in a liberalized food 
marketing system in Zaire. The focus was on search and uncertainty as underlying causes of 
transaction costs. A model incorporating uncertainty of input costs in the marketing margin was 
used to explain why producer prices decrease faster than transportation costs increase for every 
kilometre travelled. Using a transportation cost and producer price share function for the trader, 
it is shown empirically that this effect holds especially on dirt roads and less on paved roads and 
fivers. 
Frank and Henderson's (1992) analysis of vertical coordination in the United States food 
industries supports the hypothesis that transaction costs are a primary motivation for vertically 
coordinating via nonmarket arrangements. The authors concluded that the most influential 
transaction cost factors were related to uncertainty, input supplier concentration, asset specificity, 
and scale economies. Comparing vertical coordination measures that only capture product flow 
interdependencies with other specifications that incorporate coordinating methods as well, 
revealed the importance of nonmarket exchange mechanisms in reducing transactional 
inefficiencies. 
Delgado and Siamwalla (1997) explained that high value products in developing countries tend 
to be subject to very high transaction costs for market entry by smallholder producers. These high 
transaction costs vary across rural households as they are based on differential access to assets 
and information. To some extent, they noticed, this is true outside Africa as well, except that the 
institutional base for reducing these costs is especially weak in economies at early stages of 
agricultural transformation. Farm diversification in the sense of identifying promising tradable 
agricultural outputs seems a necessity for both growth and equity, through agricultural research, 
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infrastructure investment, and appropriate institutional development (Delgado and Siamwalla, 
1997). 
In a similar study on smallholder dairying under transaction costs in east Africa (Kenya and 
Ethiopia), Staal et al. (1996) showed the role of transaction costs in smallholder dairy marketing. 
Transaction costs in east African dairy were high as evidenced by the low percentage of milk 
production that was commercialized in Kenya and Ethiopia, compared to that in developed 
countries. Transaction costs increase with distance, most likely faster than transportation costs 
alone, due to the increased costs of information and risk of dairy product spoilage before a buyer 
is found . They also suggested that the role of organizations of collective action (such as 
processing parastatals, cooperatives, "self- help" groups, etc.) in reducing transaction costs was 
a recurring theme in smallholder dairy development in East Africa. When effectively managed, 
such organizations reduce transaction costs for both the producers and buyers of dairy products. 
This reduction in costs typically is due to economies of scale in collection and transport, and also 
because organizations reduce the need for information about widely dispersed and small-scale 
buyers and sellers. Therefore, research on household and sub-sector models that better integrate 
both existing transaction costs, but also the institutions and contracts that govern individual 
transactions, would be beneficial in a broader sense (Staal et al. , 1996) . 
Evidence of declining transaction costs were also observed by Ensminger (1992) among the Orma 
people of eastern Kenya. Trade increased as transaction costs of trade declined, thus affording 
better terms of trade, in part as a consequence of the spread of common institutional structures 
among both the Orma and their trading partners. The new institutions took the form of both 
conversion to Islam and state-imposed institutions such as courts, regulated weights and 
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measures, improvements In roads and telecommunications, and improved security 
(Ensminger, 1992) 
Coulter (1994) examined the liberalization process in marketing cereals in sub-Saharan Africa and 
observed the following constraints: inadequate roads and vehicles, lack of availability of trade 
credit and storage for chemicals, lack of market information, unsupportive legal frameworks and 
unwillingness of influential sections (i.e. politicians, elite) to formally support market 
liberalization. 
Matoussi and Nugent (1989) used the transaction cost approach to explain the switch to 
sharecropping from wage and fixed rent contracts in a very fertile region of Tunisia. Using a logit 
model, they concluded that factors such as out-migration of family supervisors, the increase in 
irrigation and the rise in relative cost of labour were responsible for the switch. 
A notable feature of nearly all developing countries is that most agricultural households produce 
a significant portion ofthe staple food that they consume. This is the case for a wide cross-section 
of geographical locations, levels of technological advancement, and land tenure arrangements 
(Renkow, 1990). How these semi-subsistence households allocate output of staple foods between 
home consumption and market sales is an issue that has received considerable attention from 
economists because of its important implications for aggregate market supply, food disappearance 
patterns, and the nutritional consequences for rural and urban dwellers (Renkow, 1990). 
Renkow (1990) analysed the decision-making patterns of a group of Indian households and 
concluded that two factors may motivate semi-subsistence households to hold inventories of 
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staple foods . First, households might want to minimize their reliance on local markets for the 
satisfaction of basic food needs, holding stocks of food as a guarantee against unanticipated 
supply disruptions. Second, inventories of home-produced staples might result from profit-seeking 
behaviour in response to seasonal price movements for a particular storable commodity. 
Clough (1999) investigated grain trade in northern Nigeria in the context of the social relations 
of production and exchange. Many households involved in trading justified their practices and 
actions in religious and moral terms. All commercial credit was interest-free because of social 
claims from friends, kin and other relationships. Economic change is channeled by religious belief 
and cultural value. He especially pointed out that the rural Hausa pattern of accumulation may be 
called "the pursuit of material ends through the extension of personal bonds". 
In order to deal with the costs of exchange or trade, different mechanisms or framework have 
been initiated throughout developing nations. Runge (1986) indicates that limitations due to 
distance, assets and information gap can make a necessity of joint use rights (i .e. co-operatives) 
that elsewhere might seem unprofitable or unlikely. In particular, the transaction costs of well-
defined and enforced private property rights typical in developed countries may simply be too 
great for a subsistence economy to bear. 
Agroindustrialization, through its multiple facets is also looked at as both an agent of and a 
response to globalization and induced institutional and technological change. Reardon and Barret 
(2000) suggest that the decline in some agricultural commodities can be offset by stimulating 
value-added activities (i .e. agroindustrialization) that build on production agriculture. This is, they 
contend, a necessary condition for improving living standards among resource-limited populations 
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In developing nations. Rapid technological change brought about by agroindustrialization 
processes ultimately will transform the conduct and structure of production and trade in all 
sectors, stimulating productivity and allowing customized production and marketing processes 
at lower transaction costs (Reardon and Barret, 2000). 
In the province of KwaZulu-Natal , no study has so far investigated the direct impact of 
transaction cost variables on participation in output markets and the resulting level of income 
generated. Most studies have assessed the institutional framework under which rural households 
operate (Barnes and Morris, 1997; Lyne, 1996), and input constraints which prevent efficient 
small-scale farmers from emerging in the province (Kuhn, et al. 2000; Matungul,2000; Fenwick, 
1998; Fenwick and Lyne, 1998; Thomson, 1996). 
In light of the institutional framework of rural KwaZulu-Natal, Barnes and Morris ' (1997) 
assessment, although not formally referred to, indirectly reflect the transaction cost approach by 
pointing out that KwaZulu-Natal's rural institutional environment was poorly structured (largely 
for historical reasons) . Unless changes were made, the enormous development problems already 
common among marginalized rural communities would only become worse. The same conclusion 
was arrived at a year earlier by Lyne (1996) who indicated that the inadequacy of rural 
infrastructure and legal uncertainty in the former KwaZulu homeland were two of the major 
sources of high transaction costs. Many former homelands in South Africa have dual legal systems 
(national law and tribal courts), which could be a source of confusion. 
With respect to liquidity constraints and sources of credit, Kuhn et at. (2000) assessed three 
financial institutions operating in KwaZulu-Natal and concluded that expandino branch networks b , 
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to cover emerging farmers, and better rural infrastructure would reduce client transaction costs. 
They contend that the provision of both savings and loan services to targeted emerging farmers 
and entrepreneurs would reduce borrower access costs, thus allowing savings to be used as a form 
of collateral. 
In addition, Fenwick (1998) examined the impact of liquidity constrairtts relative to other 
constraints inhibiting small-scale farming in KwaZulu-Natal and concluded that liquidity was very 
important, while imperfect land markets, information, and high transaction costs were also 
significant inhibiting factors. Furthermore, Fenwick and Lyne (1998) used an index from variables 
assumed to reflect the level of transaction costs, including gender and age of the household head, 
length of residency, number of migrant workers, district dummy and ownership of a car to identifY 
and rank the determinants of internal and external credit rationing in rural households. The results 
indicated that high transaction costs faced by sample households limit their access to formal credit 
markets. 
As for land use in the communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal , Thomson (1996) used discriminant 
analysis to separate lessors and lessees for land in communal areas of rural KwaZulu-Natal and 
concluded that land rental markets were constrained because property rights to arable land were 
insecure and transaction costs were high. These problems, he argued, came from two sources: the 
user did not have exclusive rights to arable land, and the risk of losing land as a result of rental 
transactions was too high. After Thomson (1996) had initiated adaptive strategies to improve 
tenure security in the area, a reduction in transaction costs and risk in the rental market resulted . 
However, more needs to be done, and he recommends that the government could and should help 
to ensure that local precedents and national laws reinforce a household 's security of tenure. 
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Better district roads and taxi services in the Impendle and Swayimana communal regions of 
KwaZulu-Natal have made it easier for residents to buy foodstuffs in nearby towns. Transaction 
costs for these households were lower by going to nearby towns than moving around their 
respective areas in search of foodstuffs (Matungul,2000). 
In the rest of South Africa, Makhura (2001) investigated the role of transaction costs in 
determining market participation of small-scale farmers in the Northern province and revealed that 
access to assets (i .e. sizeable arable land, livestock, maize sales, non-farm income) and market 
information (i .e. contact with extension officers, proximity to markets), together with some 
household characteristics (i .e. household size, gender and age of head) were the major 
determinants of market participation. Previously, Mathye et at. (2000) used the transaction cost 
approach to explain market participation of smallholders in the Northern Province. Their study 
found that banana and mangoe producers who sold their products used different formal and 
informal channels, such as fresh produce markets and direct sales to consumers through roadside 
markets. Market participation was significantly influenced by transport problems, access to market 
outlets, and education and awareness of various marketing opportunities. Also, Makhura (1994) 
determined that access to agricultural information, the use of formal marketing channels and 
information management were distinguishing factors between farmers groups in the former 
Kangwane area of Mpumalanga. Another transaction cost study was initiated by Karaan (1999) 
who analysed transaction costs associated with mussel mariculture in Saldhana Bay. The study 
compared four models and concluded that agricultural franchising was the most suitable form of 
enterprise in dealing with high transaction costs. 
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In sum, the basic premise of agricultural market reform is that improving the incentive structure 
for small farmers (i .e. well functioning markets and higher product prices) will generate a positive 
supply response, increasing both agricultural output and income levels . Nonprice factors, 
including the condition of physical infrastructure (i.e. roads, communication networks), the 
availability of marketing services, modem inputs and credit in rural areas, and government support 
in the form of research and extension services have had a more profound impact on aggregate 
agricultural output than prices (Kherallah et ai. 2000) 
The preceding review of literature has provided a clearer pattern of factors responsible for 
transaction costs. Market participation is influenced by fixed transaction costs, while its level and 
the output sold are primarily determined by both variable and fixed transaction costs. Transaction 
costs facing smallholder farmers are generally unobservable but do inhibit possible participation 
in market exchanges, that is, when the costs of exchange are higher than the value or utility 
derived from a transaction, farmers will not participate in the market. Transaction costs result 
from differential access to assets and information. There is consensus however that the presence 
of transaction costs will affect the pattern and the level of participation in the market which 
ultimately determine the level of income derived. Transaction costs include costs resulting from 
distance to markets, poor infrastructure, high marketing margins, imperfect information, 
supervision and incentive costs. Distance to markets, together with the poor infrastructure, poor 
access to assets and information lead to high exchange costs. 
Given the nature of these costs (i .e. unobservable), the concept of transaction costs in various 
empirical analyses has been captured by defining a range of variables. The first set of variables 
represent access to assets . They include the size of allocated arable land, livestock ownership, 
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transport assets and liquidity. The second group indicate access to information, such as distance 
and condition of the roads to market centres and direct access to market information. The rest of 
the variables reflect socio-economic characteristic of the household . Access to market 
information, assets and market outlets, combined with improved physical (i.e. roads & 
telecommunications) and institutional (i .e. legal right, contract enforcement) infrastructure could 
significantly lower transaction costs, thus, stimulate market participation and income. 
With this overview of the literature on the New Institutional Economics and Transaction Cost 
Economics , the following chapter deals with the research sites and data collection procedures. 




RESEARCH SITES AND DATA COLLECTION 
In this chapter a description of the two study areas and the methods used to collect survey data and 
field operations are presented. The study areas, namely the Impendle and Swayimana regions in 
K waZulu-Natal, represent two distinct bioclimatic regions ofK waZulu-Natal and have different levels 
of agricultural potential. Multi-stage sampling techniques were used to collect data. Impendle and 
Swayimana each constituted a stratum from which a number of primary-stage-units (PSU's ) were 
selected. Household activities, characteristics and socio-economic data were recorded in a 
predesigned questionnaire through interviews. Interviews in Swayimana were conducted during 
January and February 1999, while the survey in Impendle was conducted in April and May 1999. 
Figure 3.1 shows the location oflmpendle and Swayimana regions of KwaZulu-Natal. 
3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREAS 
3.1.1 Impendle 
Located southwest of the provincial city of Pietermaritzburg, Impendle covers more than ten 
subwards and is approximately 85 km from downtown Pietermaritzburg. Impendle falls under 
bioclimatic region 4, which extends seawards from the foothills of the Drakensberg at an elevation 
of between 1400-1950 metres above sea level (Phillips, 1973). Winters are cold and frosts are severe 
to very severe (Van Heerden, 1974). Early spring winds are a hazard as they are usually very hot. 
Annual rainfall varies between 800-1500 mm, with an average of920 mm. Mean annual temperatures 
vary between 13 and 15°C. During the winter months snow is a common phenomenon. Vleis are more 
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Fig 3.1 Map Showing location of the study areas in KwaZulu-Natal. 
73 
frequent than in the Mistbelt region and occupy up to eight percent of the landscape. The 
Impendle region has agricultural potential but is mostly suited to animal husbandry. Crop 
production includes cultivation of potatoes, maize and vegetables; however, soil acidity is a major 
obstacle to agricultural production. 
Impendle is easily accessible by tar roads (district roads) . Taxi services regularly commute from 
the area to nearby towns (Pietermaritzburg, Howick) and vice-versa. The area's proximity to 
Pietermaritzburg provide farmers with an important market outlet for agricultural products. Yet, 
the poor state of secondary (gravel) roads within the area does not always make transport easy, 
especially in rainy conditions and at night. 
3.1.2 Swayimana 
Swayimana lies at an elevation of between 800 and 1000 metres with a gentle terrain . It falls into 
Phillip 's (1973) bioclimatic region 3 (Mistbelt) and is well supplied with water (Stewart, 1986). 
The weather is cool and moist with annual precipitation exceeding 1000mm. Mean annual 
temperatures vary between 16 and 18°C. The region is well suited to cropping, forestry and 
intensive livestock production. The entire area is 7500 ha in extent and the centre is approximately 
65 km from the provincial city of Pietermaritzburg. Swayimana farmers grow more crops and 
vegetables (potatoes, cabbage, madumbis, maize, etc.) than those in Impendle, where livestock 
tends to predominate. 
The agricultural potential of these regions is high (Kars, 1998) and maize, beans, potatoes and 
madumbi (in Swayimana) are important food and cash crops. Various vegetables, cabbage and 
74 
tomatoes are also grown. The two study areas are relatively well served by taxi's (passenger vans) . 
A trip to Swayimana, for instance, takes about one hour from Pietermaritzburg. The two areas' 
proximity to Pietermaritzburg could provide farmers with an important market outlet for agricultural 
products. Indeed, many people who live in these areas commute to jobs in nearby towns ( 
Pietermaritzburg, Wartburg, Howick, Pinetown, and Durban), sometimes on a daily basis. However, 
the poor state of secondary (gravel) roads within these areas makes travel difficult, especially at night 
and in rainy conditions. 
3.2 SAMPLING TECHNIQUES AND SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
A multi-stage sampling procedure was used in the survey of rural households in each study area 
(stratum). The goal in designing surveys is to maximize the information obtained for a fixed 
expenditure. Samples displaying small variability among measurements will produce small bounds on 
the errors of estimation. Thus, if all households in one stratum tend to think alike on marketing issues, 
accurate estimates of those perceptions can be obtained with a relatively small sample (Lyne, 1981). 
Within each study area, residents share the same culture, institutions (formal and informal) and almost 
the same agronomic environment. It follows that households within these areas should exhibit similar 
marketing behaviour and low variability in crops produced. 
3.2.1 The multi-stage concept 
The initial step consisted in obtaining permission from the tribal authorities to conduct research in the 
regions. The boundaries of each study area were then defined. Multi-stage techniques constitute an 
important part of advanced sampling theory and involves the following steps (Lyne,1981) : 
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Step 1: Define the survey area. 
Step2: Divide the survey area into unique primary-stage units (PSU's). 
Step3 : Group the PSU's into strata. 
Step4: Select random PSU's from each stratum 
Step5 : List the second-stage units (SSU's or farm homesteads) in each sample PSu. 
Step6 : Select random SSU's from each sample PSU. 
Latt (1987) summarized the procedure as follows : 
a) A survey region is selected and divided into a number of non-overlapping primary sampling 
units (PSU' s). Homogeneous PSU's may be further grouped into strata in order to improve the 
sample precision. b) At the first stage, a sample ofPSU's is drawn using a suitable method (in this 
case, with probability proportionate to size) . c) A list is made of all the secondary sampling units 
(SSU's) in each selected PSu. d) A sample is then drawn of the SSU's in each of the selected 
PSU's and relevant data collected. Third-stage units may be identified if required . 
3.2.1.1 Impendle 
A total of 120 households were sampled in each stratum. lmpendle was divided into nine primary-
stage units (PSU's), of which five were selected with probability proportionate to size (Kothari, 
1990:78) . Where possible, roads and other landmarks were used to define PSU boundaries. Since 
exact figures about the total population within each unit were not available, estimates ofPSU size 
were based on household counts taken from orthophoto maps. 
Table 3.1 lists the PSU's and indicates the number of households sampled in each of the selected 
76 
PSU' s. The overall sampling rate in this stratum was almost 4%. 
Table 3.1 Estimated size of primary-stage units in Impendle, KwaZulu-Natal, 1999 
PSU Households Range Probability Selected Sample size 
Inguga 400 I - 400 0.12638 
Mgodi 430 401 - 830 0.13586 Yes 19 
Inzinga 425 831 - 1255 0.13428 
Smilo Bar 460 1256 - 1715 0.14534 Yes 32 
Maxam 280 1716-1995 0.08847 Yes 16 
Come&See 180 1996 - 2175 0.05687 
Kheta 300 2176 - 2475 0.09479 
Gomane 500 2476 - 2975 0.15798 Yes 35 
Nhlabankosi 190 2976 - 3165 0.06003 Yes 18 
3.2.1.2 Swayimana 
The same approach was used to select PSU's and households in Swayimana. This stratum was 
divided into 11 PSU's of which five were selected . Table 3.2 shows that a sampling rate of 12% 
was applied within each selected PSU yielding an overall sampling rate of roughly 5% in this 
stratum. 
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Table 3.2 Estimated size of primary-stage units in Swayimana, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 
PSU Households Range Probability Selected Sample size 
Mambedwini 13 1 1 - 131 0.05728 Yes 15 
Ekupoleni 234 132 - 365 0.10232 
Ngololeni 116 366 - 481 0.05072 Yes 13 
Okhasini 165 482 - 646 0.07215 
Elangeni 108 647 - 754 0.04722 
Msilili 300 755 - 1054 0.13118 Yes 35 
Ndlaveleni 229 1055 - 1283 0.10013 
Odlameni 258 1284-1541 0.11281 
Nkululeko 242 1542 - 1783 0.10582 Yes 28 
Etsheni 255 1784 - 2038 0.1115 
Emahlathini 249 2039 - 2287 0.10888 Yes 29 
3.3 QUESTIONNAIRE 
The survey instrument recorded in detail all household activities (farm and non-farm), livestock 
numbers, inputs used, expenditures and sales for the 1997/98 season. The questionnaire also 
captured socio-economic data such as household characteristics, land size and property rights, 
farm characteristics, investment in capital equipment and assets, savings activity and participation 
in markets and farmers ' institutions. Other questions explored farmers ' perceptions of market 
constraints, information sources, management capacity, access to physical and institutional 
infrastructure, and demographic characteristics. 
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The interviews elicited farmers ' perceptions of existing marketing channels and whether or not 
they would like to see changes in these institutions. Information variables covered the importance 
of extension services and other institutions (farmers' associations) as sources of market 
information. Management capacity and the ability to assume risk were measured by the number 
of farm enterprises and the ratio of net worth to assets. A broader portfolio of farm enterprises 
and a higher ratio of net worth to assets usually indicates greater managerial ability (Fu, et aI. , 
1988). Demographic factors included the supply of on-farm family labour, dependency ratio and 
educational status. Farmers literate in English are expected to have better access to information 
or innovations, thus reducing the subjective probability of failure in marketing their products. 
Other factors considered the presence of physical infrastructure (market place, banks, roads and 
telecommunication) and institutions that influence farming and marketing decisions (legal system 
and contract enforcement). A copy of the questionnaire used is presented in Appendix 1. 
Enumerators were employed in each stratum and trained to apply the survey instrument. Four 
female matriculants fluent in both Zulu and English in each study area were trained and appointed 
to assist in the survey. A pilot survey was conducted to check the performance of enumerators 
and the validity of some questions. Informal interviews with key informants supplemented the 
survey information Agricultural extension officers, school principals, teachers, farmers ' 
representatives, and members of the tribal authority (Nkosi and Indunas) provided useful 
background information about agriculture and certain programmes affecting local farmers. 
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3.4 FIELD OPERATIONS 
After meeting with the Director of the Southwest Region ofKwaZulu-Natal in Hilton, the author 
was introduced to the agricultural district officers of both Umvoti (Swayimana) and Hlanganani 
(Impendle) . These officers in turn organized meetings with local leaders during which four female 
matriculants in each study area were chosen for the survey. Matriculants were required to be 
fluent in both English and Zulu. Prior to the main survey, a week was set aside for the training of 
the selected matriculants. The training consisted of understanding the questionnaire (Appendix 
1) and interpreting it. This opportunity was also used to explain the objectives of the study and 
its relevance. Different Indunas (headmen) and extension officers were used to introduce the team 
to the respondents and explain the aim of the survey. Extension officers were also used in the 
listing and identification of households from selected primary-stage units. 
During the survey, where possible, the size of allocated arable land was measured by the team 
with a metre-wheel. After each interview, a check was made on the questionnaire to ensure that 
all questions were correctly interpreted and that questionnaires had been correctly completed. The 
next chapter presents the socio-economic characteristics of the sample households. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a context in which to understand and draw implications 
about the potential of and interests in physical and institutional infrastructure improvement in the 
two study areas. Household characteristics within the study areas, where marketing constraints 
are being evaluated, are important in order to understand the magnitudes of these constraints. It 
is also imperative to assess the extent to which support systems currently in place respond 
adequately to the needs of communal farmers . To get a broader picture of the environment in 
which these farmers operate, it is important to analyse the demographic information, availability 
and accessibility of extension services, the land tenure systems, marketing channels used and other 
related issues. There are major socio-economic constraints on production and marketing potential 
in the two study areas, although the extent or conditions vary between and within the districts. 
4.1 HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
Some selected variables in this study have skewed distributions and therefore both their mean and 
median will be used to summarise the information. The median is a more representative criterion 
than the mean in data sets with skewed distributions (Steyn et a!. , 1995). The descriptive statistics 
presented in this chapter were computed as if a simple random sample of households had been 
drawn from each stratum. This approach introduces some bias into the sample estimates unless 
the primary-stage units (PSUs) are of equal size within each stratum. The median and mean 
characteristics of household heads are summarised in Table 4. 1. 
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Differences between strata were tested using the Mann-Whitney statistic (Steyn et al., 1995, cited 
by Nell et aI. , 1999) for the medians and t test for the means. 
The population structure in rural KwaZulu-Natal is generally female inclined, with women 
constituting 54% of people in the economically active age group (Marcus, 1995). However, 
within the two study areas, 64% of sample household heads were males and 36% females . 
Female-headed households made up 33% of the total sample in Impendle and 39% of the sample 
in Swayimana. The mean age of the household head in Impendle was 57.9 years with a median 
of 59 years, while Swayimana household heads had an average age of 59 years with a median of 
60 years. 
Table 4.1 Median and Mean characteristics of the sample farmers in Impendle and 
Swayimana, KwaZulu-Natal, 1999 
CHARACTERISTICS IMPENDLE SWAYIMANA W(U) 
(n= 120) (n= 100) Pvalue' 
Median Mean Median Mean 
Age of household head (years) 59 58 60 59 0.375 
Family size (members) 6 6.2 7 7.1 .002*** 
Education level (fon11al years) 5 5 5 6 0.14 
Management skills (number of 4 4.2 6 6 .000*** 
enterprises) 
Residence in the area (years) 24 25.4 29.5 38 .000*** 
Land size (hectares) 1 1.1 1.5 2 .000*** 
Livestock income (RJ year) 114 1943 0 265 .000*** 
Off-farm income (per year) 500 536 1000 576 .000*** 
Crop income (per year) 725 1183 1200 1698 .000*** 
Distance to public phone 2 3 3 5 .001 *** 
(kilometres) 
I Mann-Whitney test 













The ability to conduct business beyond the communal areas was assessed in terms of the 
household head ' s formal years of education and his or her knowledge of the English language. 
The proportion of households with a literate head is quite low at 28% in Impendle and 38% in 
Swayimana. Overall, 59% of household heads could not speak and write English. The median 
formal years of education was similar in Impendle and Swayimana (five years). The implicit 
consequence of this situation is that most farmers would face high transaction costs in marketing 
their products outside of the study areas. 
With a mean monthly household income ofR788 and a mean monthly per capita income ofR126 
in the rural areas, the province ofKwaZulu-Natal has the third highest incidence of poverty in the 
country and approximately 60% of the population lives below the Household Subsistence Level 
(May, 1995). Wage employment in nearby towns and local commercial agriculture constitute the 
main sources of income in rural KwaZulu-Natal. These sources are supplemented by remittances, 
income from entrepreneurial activities and welfare transfers (pension payments) . In the two study 
areas the pattern of income sources is similar, although there are variations in the order of 
importance of various sources. Household off-farm incomes are low and the results show that 
income distribution is heavily skewed towards lower income levels with a median monthly off-
farm income ofR500 and RI000, and a median crop income ofR725 and R1200 for Impendle 
and Swayimana, respectively. 
4.2 LAND TENURE AND RIGHTS 
The land tenure system which prevails in the study areas is an adaptation of the tribal system of 
land allocation (Lenta, 1981). Land is not held as "private property" with exclusive rights vested 
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in individual or juristic persons. Instead, the tribal authority allocates land to residents according 
to customary rules. Once allocated, families may endow individual members with right of usufruct, 
but neither the individual nor his/her family owns the land outright. Land which is not used by the 
household for residential purposes or crops becomes communal grazing. In winter, after the 
harvest, the cropland is also opened for communal grazing. About 48% of sample households in 
lmpendle have less than one hectare of arable land, whereas in Swayimana about 52% have 
between one and two hectares (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Distribution of arable land by sample households in Impendle and Swayimana, 
1999 
IMPENDLE (n =117) SWA YIMANA (n =120 ) 
Size of arable n 0/0 n 0/0 
land (in hectares) 
< 1 ha 56 47.9 24 20 
1 - 2 ha 45 38.5 62 51.7 
2.1 - 5 ha 16 13.7 33 27 .5 
> 5 ha 0 0 1 0.8 
Total 117 120 
There was no official explanation for the range in land sizes in both study areas. However, 
informal interviews pointed to the arbitrary way in which land is allocated by the tribal authority 
as the main reason for this disparity. ~Iocated land size depended not only on the availability of 
land, but mainly on the household 's status or acquaintance in the community. According to 
custom, every household has the right to a plot of ( arable) land. However, some households do 
not use all of their allocated land for agricultural activities, but keep it for "social security" 
reasons. While some land was left fallow, 75% of all respondents in Swayimana and 89% in 
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Impendle claimed to have cultivated their entire arable allotment. Reasons offered for not 
cultivating the entire area revolved around capital and labour constraints. 
Only 10% of farmers in Impendle were able to access the extra land they needed, compared to 
16% in Swayimana despite the absence of rules preventing neighbours from leasing out unused 
arable land. Informal discussions suggested that many households were unwilling to participate 
in rental transactions for fear that they may lose permanent rights to the land. The absence of an 
efficient rental market for arable land is undermining efficient land use. Thomson (1996) 
concluded that rental markets are constrained because property rights to land are insecure and 
transaction costs high. While respondents in this study were not concerned about being 
dispossessed as a result ofleasing land out, it is possible (as in Thomson' s study) that prospective 
tenants faced uncertainty in enforcing rental contracts in tribal courts. Despite the absence of a 
rental market for land, 53% of households sampled in Swayimana claimed to have bought their 
land. This could not be confirmed as no one was able to produce a legal title for the land acquired. 
4.3 INPUT PURCHASES 
The productivity of small-scale farmers cannot be successfully increased without an effective 
marketing system for their products and inputs (Harper and Kavura, 1982). The lack of capital to 
hire oxen or a tractor and to purchase seeds and fertilizers, and also the unavailability of these 
inputs in their areas, were widely expressed by respondents as the main constraint to their farming 
activities. Table 4.3 summarises the type of inputs acquired by sample households. 
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Table 4.3 Type of inputs purchased by sample households in Impendle and Swayimana, 
KwaZulu-Natal, 1997/98. 
INPUTS IMPENDLE (n=120) SWA YIMANA (n=120) 
n 0/0 n 0/0 
Manure 41 34 60 50 
Fertilisers 100 83 119 99 
Lime 60 50 0 0 
Seeds 115 96 62 52 
Hired ploughing service 103 86 108 90 
Hired animal draught service 48 40 30 25 
Hired transport service 26 22 0 0 
Hired labour 24 20 43 36 
Chemicals 23 19 12 10 
Mean farm expenses (R) 783 .01 1199.43 
The majority of households in both study areas purchased fertilisers and seeds, and hired 
ploughing services. 
4.4 MARKETING AND CROP INCOME 
4.4.1 Marketing channels and marketed crops 
All households sampled in Impendle produced surpluses intended for the market, whereas 20 
households (17%) in Swayimana did not sell any product. Isolation from the main roads and poor 
conditions of secondary roads render marketing activities very difficult for farmers and private 
traders (e.g. hawkers). Informal marketing channels such as neighbours, local shops and pension 
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markets were widely used by farmers in both regions with the majority of respondents (98% in 
Impendle and 56% in Swayimana) selling their products to neighbours. About 29% of respondents 
in Swayimana sold to hawkers compared to 33% in Impendle. The limited number of private 
traders venturing into these areas means that some farmers do not have access to more formal 
markets. Table 4.4 lists marketed agricultural products in both study areas. The two main crops 
produced and sold are potatoes in Impendle and madumbis (a root crop) in Swayimana. Potatoes 
were produced and sold by 73% of the sample households in Impendle, compared to 86% of 
respondents in Swayimana who sold madumbis. Local or regional stakeholders should consider 
ways of developing market outlets for these crops through appropriate institutions. Advertising 
methods employed by respondents revolved around the use of word-of-mouth, notice boards and 
roadside displays, and they based their prices on those of local competitors. 
Table 4.4 Marketed agricultural products and generated mean income of surplus-
producing sample households in Impendle and Swayimana, KwaZulu-Natal, 1997/98. 
IMPENDLE (n = 120) SWA YIMANA ( n = 100 )* 
CROP n 0/0 Mean Income (R) n 0/0 Mean Income (R) 
Maize (green ) 7 5.8 16.79 26 26 102 .08 
Maize (grain ) 29 24 .2 176 .75 27 27 92.45 
Madumbis 1 0.83 1.25 86 86 461.33 
Potato 87 72 .5 424.45 63 63 257 .83 
Sweet potatoes 1 0.83 1.66 60 60 236.55 
Dry beans 56 46.7 304 .91 52 52 199.25 
Green vegetables 89 74.2 290 .08 13 13 67.37 
Mean fann size (ha) 1.1 1.8 
Mean number of fam1 4.2 5.8 
enterprises 
Gross crop income (R) 1182.58 1415.75 
* Twenty households did not sell any crops in Swayimana. 
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4.4.2 Expenditures and crop income 
Table 4.5 provides mean expenditures on inputs and mean incomes from the sale of agricultural 
products in Impendle and Swayimana. Households in Impendle spent on average R 783 on inputs 
compared to R1199 in Swayimana. This difference may be due to a greater focus on livestock in 
Impendle, with lower costs involved in tending livestock. On average, potatoes provided the 
highest income in Impendle (R424) and madumbis (R461) in Swayimana. 
Table 4.5 Expenditures and incomes (Rand) of marketed produce by surplus-producing 
sample households in Impendle and Swayimana, KwaZulu-Natal, 1997/98 
ITEMS (in Rand) IMPENDLE (n=120) SWAYIMANA (n=100) 
range (R) mean (R) range (R) mean (R) 
Expenditure on farm inputs 50 - 3805 783 80 - 7437 1] 99 
Tota] sales (crops + livestock) 100 - 34100 3155 0-27180 2518 
Non-fann income (wages, remittances, etc.) 0-6000 536 0-16450 576 
Income from selling crops 80 - 1151 1183 0-9325 1416 
Livestock sales o -33400 1943 0-7200 265 
Madumbis 0- 150 l.25 0-2500 46]* 
Maize (green) 0-500 17 0- 1200 102 
Maize (grain) 0-4000 177 0-2500 92 
Potatoes 0-7500 424* 0-4000 258 
Dry beans 0-4780 305 0- 1500 199 
Sweet potatoes 0-200 2 0-2500 237 
Green vegetables & others 0-2600 290 0-2000 67 
*Shows the highest crop income per household 
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4.5 CREDIT USE AND SOURCES 
[ ;;;; two farmers (one in each study area) used credit for the purchase of fertilizers. Owing to the 
importance of collateral to the functioning of credit markets, the absence of well-defined and 
enforced private property rights in land may effectively prohibit the successful operation of formal 
credit markets in rural areas (Feder and Feeny, 1991).The absence of formal credit institutions 
within the two settlements might explain the lack of credit use. question was asked to assess 
whether sample farmers would consider borrowing capital to expand their farming activities if 
formal credit institutions were within acceptable distances. Almost all farmers knew about 
borrowing and would consider this option. However, as shown in Figure 4.1 , their preferred 
sources of credit differed considerably and favoured informal sources oflending rather than formal 
sources, such as banks and government lending institutions (e.g. Ithala). Neighbours, relatives and 
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Figure 4 1. Preferred source of credit by household heads sampled in Impendle 
and Swayimana, KwaZulu-Natal, 1999. 
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Impendle, while in Swayimana over 40% of respondents would prefer formal banks·Fes~ 
findings suggest that borrowers face much lower transaction costs in local, informal credit 
m~ts(RecentlY' however, fonnal schemes (i.e. credit co-operatives) initiated to extend loans 
to some communal farmers in KwaZulu-Natal have proven unsuccessful (Ferrer, 2001). The 
100% level of saving imposed in order to secure an individual loan has been the main deterrent 
factor for many communal farmers. It might therefore be beneficial for both formal (e .g . Ithala, 
credit co-operatives) and informal (i .e. stockvel) lenders to strengthen their ties with one another 
and proceed with group lending schemes. Group lending reduces the problem of moral hazard as 
members know each other and can monitor each other' s behaviour (Meyer, et at., 1992). 
4.6 MARKETING CONSTRAINTS 
Obstacles such as limited market outlets, poor roads and transport were often mentioned as the 
main challenges to the respondents' marketing activities . This situation is further exacerbated by 
the fact that many farmers produce the same products, thus increasing competition. Alleviating 
the perceived marketing challenges listed in Table 4.6 through "grass-roots" initiatives could 
boost commercial agriculture within these communal areas . Access to market outlets appears to 
be more limiting than does transport suggesting that factors such as poor marketing skills and 
information, and the inability to communicate and contract may be the underlying problems. 
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Table 4.6 Marketing problems mentioned by sample household heads in Impendle and 
Swayimana, 1999 
IMPENDLE (n = 120 ) SWAYIMANA (n = 100) 
Problem n 0/0 n % 
Market outlets 74 61.7 4 4 
Competition 20 16.7 7 7 
Transport 18 15 22 22 
Payment collection 14 11.7 24 24 
Bad roads 12 10 1 1 
4.7 EXTENSION SERVICES AND FARMERS' TRAINING NEEDS 
4.7.1 Extension services 
Visits by extension officers and membership offarmers ' associations were expected to be the most 
important sources of market information for sample farmers . Extension services provide farmers 
with information on technology and other aspects of agriculture that can increase their production 
and income (Martin and Taylor, 1995). Table 4.7 shows an assessment of extension contacts in 
the study areas in terms of household heads knowing the extension officers operating in their area 
and in terms of visits received. 
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Table 4.7 Extension services and information sources, household heads in Impendle and 
Swayimana, KwaZulu-Natal, 1997/98 
Characteristics IMPENDLE (n =120 ) SWA YIMANA ( N =120) 
n 0/0 n 0/0 
Visited by extension officer 53 44 .2 29 24.1 
Visited the extension officer 44 36.7 24 20 
Knew extension officer's name 69 57.5 56 46.7 
Knew name, but no contact 15 12.5 27 22.5 
Member of farmers' association 41 34.2 7 5.8 
Cooperate with commercial farmers 23 19.2 26 21.6 
Would cooperate with com. farmers 100 83.3 115 95.8 
Attended agricultural training 30 25 15 12.5 
Access to extension services was determined by asking if the household head or anyone else in 
the household had been visited by a government extension officer during the 1997/98 farming 
season. In Impendle, about 44% -of the household heads interviewed indicated that they or a 
household member had face-to-face contact with, or were visited by, a government extension 
officer, compared to only 24% of household heads in Swayimana. On average, sample households 
in both study areas received one visit per year from an extension officer Household heads were 
also asked if they had attended meetings and agricultural training organised at a local centre, 
whether they knew the extension officer serving in their area and whether they had cooperated 
with nearby commercial farmers. About 58% of household heads in Impendle knew the name of 
their extension officer compared to 47% in Swayimana. Only 25% and 13% of household heads, 
respectively, attended any agricultural training organized in their areas . The lack of information 
is evidenced by an overwhelming percentage of household heads willing to cooperate with large-
scale commercial farmers to gain any kind of agricultural expertise. 
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Chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if there was differential access to extension 
services based on household head characteristics and the size of allocated arable land. The results 
reveal that there were no significant differences in terms of access to extension with respect to the 
age, gender and years of formal education of respondents. 
Table 4.8 Distribution of extension visits and membership of farmers' associations with 
respect to allocated arable land in Swayimana, 1999 
Household head had visit from Household head is member of 
extension officer farmers ' association 
Yes No Yes No 
(n =30) (n = 90) (n =7) (n =113) 
Land size 
~ 2 ha (n = 86) 53 .3 % 77.8 % 42 .9 % 73.4 % 
>2 ha (n = 34) 46 .7 % 22 .2 % 57.1 % 26.6 % 
X2 = 6.621 X2= 3.038 
df=l df= 1 
P = 0.010 P = 0.081 
With respect to the size of allocated arable land, the incidence of sample households visited by an 
extension officer is higher for those with smaller farms (Table 4 .8). More contact is afforded to 
farmers with less than two hectares of arable land (these are probably members of community 
gardens). The data in Table 4.8 also suggest that membership of farmers ' associations in 
Swayimana was significantly associated with the size of allocated arable land . The majority of 
household heads who operate more than two hectares are members offarmers ' associations . In 
Impendle, however, this relationship was not significant. About 20% of respondents in both 
lmpendle and Swayimana resolved the lack of extension services by cooperating at different levels 
with nearby commercial farmers . 
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4.7.2 Maj or training needs 
It is evident from the previous section that the extension services can and should play an 
important role in satisfying the training needs expressed by respondents in Table 4.9 . 
Table 4.9 Training needs expressed in order of importance in Impendle and Swayimana, 
1999 
IMPENDLE (n =120) SWAYlMANA (n =100) 
I. Marketing skills 68.3% 1. Soil conservation 76.6% 
2. Planning of production 51.6% 2. Marketing skills 37.5% 
3. Soil conservation 42.5% 3. Livestock & poultry 31.6% 
4. Farm budgeting 14.1% 4. F ann budgeting 18.3% 
5. Livestock & poultry 12 .5% 5. Planning of production 10.0% 
In addition to the need for training skills, other requirements such as access to credit and market 
outlets were expressed. Their incidence is summarised in Table 4 .10. 
Table 4.10. Other important needs expressed by sample household heads in Impendle and 
Swayimana, KwaZulu-Natal, 1999. 
Needs IMPENDLE (0=120) SWAYIMANA (0=120) 
0 0/0 n 0/0 
Improved roads 60 50 45 37.5 
Credit/Loans 43 35 .8 50 41.7 
Market outlets 55 45 .8 70 58.3 
Tractor services 35 29.2 20 16 .7 
Seeds fertilisers & fences 65 54.2 12 10 
Banking facilities 8 6.7 55 45 .8 
More arable land 60 50 30 25 
Advice on marketing crops 3 2.5 2 1.7 
Stron!! laws against theft/strav cattle 5 4.2 0 0 
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Market outlets was the need most mentioned by sample household heads in Swayimana (58%), 
followed by banking facilities (46%) and credit (42%). In Impendle, besides the need to acquire 
inputs such as seeds and fertilisers (54%), improved roads (50%), access to more arable land 
(50%) and market outlets (46%) were mentioned as important conditions for increased output 
and sales. 
4.8 BUYING PATTERNS FOR STAPLE FOODS 
Better district roads and taxi services make it easier for rural residents of Impendle and 
Swayimana to shop in nearby towns (Pietermaritzburg, Wartburg, Howick, Pinetown). However, 
survey results in Table 4.11 indicate that an overwhelming number of these households still buy 
their staple foodstuffs from within their own areas. Even though only 38% of households in 
lmpendle and 35% in Swayimana bought foodstuffs from their neighbours, 98% and 83% bought 
from local sellers. Swayimana has the largest percentage of its sample households (63%) buying 
staple foodstuffs in town, as opposed to only 46% in Impendle. 
A large proportion of sample households in both areas expected a high quality of fresh staple 
foodstuffs from their neighbours (39% and 48%) . Yet less than 40% bought staples from their 
neighbours . One explanation is that cash is saved in town for safety reasons and therefore 
shopping is done there. Another reason is that local supplies ar~ highly seasonal and therefore not 
always available. Proximity and transport appear to influence buying decisions; distance and bus 
fares are negatively related to the proportion of households that shop for food staples in town. 
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Table 4.11 Factors and characteristics affecting the patterns of staple food purchases by 
sample rural households in Impendle and Swayimana, KwaZulu-Natal, 1999 
IMPENDLE (n=120) SWA YIMANA(n=120) 
n 0/0 n 0/0 
Household head buying habits 
Buy within the area 118 98 .3 100 83.3 
Buy in town 55 45 .8 75 62.5 
Buy from commercial farmers 19 15.8 3 2.5 
Buy from immediate neighbours 46 38 .3 42 35 
Household head expects high food quality 
In town 49 40.8 49 40 .8 
From neighbours 47 39.2 58 48.3 
From commercial farmers 22 18.3 13 10.8 
Others factors influencing household head buying habits 
Bank accounts in town 79 65 .8 85 70.8 
Own a car/bakkie 33 27.5 46 38.3 
Distance to Pietermaritzburg 85 km 60 km 
Bus fare to Pietermaritzburg R13 R8 
In sum, descriptive analysis of the sample survey data collected in the Impendle and Swayimana 
regions shows the extent to which emerging small-scale farm households have access to formal 
markets and other services such as agricultural extension, training and market information. Results 
indicate that the majority of the sample households sell their produce mainly through informal 
channels, e.g. neighbours . Sample households have difficulty marketing in towns due to poor 
physical and institutional infrastructure and weak socio-economic status. Poor roads and 
communication systems, transport, capital constraints, the absence of a rental market for land, 
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an uncertain legal system, low levels of education and limited knowledge of English amongst 
household heads, are major constraints to market development in the study areas. Extension 
services are confined to specific programmes and do not necessarily reflect the real needs of small 
farmers in the study areas . Major problems expressed by farmers were the lack of marketing 
facilities and skills, extension services and inadequate capital. Responsive local institutions which 
address high transaction costs and improve access to information and assets would facilitate 
markets and assist farmers in generating higher income from their activities . 
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CHAPTERS 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 DIMENSIONS OF TRANSACTION COSTS IN IMPENDLE AND SWAYIMANA. 
The objective of this section is to explore the linkages between transaction cost factors and the 
marketing activities as observed in the study areas. Building on the New Institutional Economics ' 
work of such authors as Delgado (1999) and North (1990), these factors are introduced and links 
are made with their impacts on marketing activities of sample households. Transaction costs are 
the resources required or involved in trade. These costs can be explicit as well as implicit (Chavas 
et al. ,2000) . Explicit transaction costs include transportation costs and implicit costs refer to the 
opportunity cost of time spent by farmers in gathering information, searching for new partners or 
new market outlets (i.e. traveling and waiting time). The implicit costs are the highest, suggesting 
that the proximity of institutions (marketplace, market outlets, etc) is of crucial importance 
(Gonzalez-vega, 1993). In short, transaction costs are the embodiment of barriers to market 
participation by resource-poor small-holders (Holloway et al. , 2000) . 
The legal status of a woman is not high in tribal areas. Gender and social standings have an 
influence on the outcomes of disputes, as exchanges in developing countries often occur in the 
context of personalized relationships. This elevates the risk in transactions and increases the 
transaction costs involved as opposed to formal and impersonal contracts (Berry, 1993). Risk 
involved from the time gap before a transaction is completed also contributes to transaction costs. 
A much less risky environment and less risky clients or partners can be produced through 
improving the socio-economic environment of small-scale farmers . This can be realised through 
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better communication and transport and improved agricultural marketing and production skills 
through strengthening support services (Coetzee,1995). In their study of Mexican households, 
Key et al. , (2000) found that transaction costs playa significant role in explaining household 
behaviour. 
5.1.1 Principal component analysis 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is used to assess transaction cost dimensions in the study 
areas. The object of the analysis is to take p variables XI' X2, .. . Xp and find combinations of these 
to produce indices Z/1 Z2' ''' Zp that are uncorrelated . The lack of correlation is a useful property 
because it means that the indices are measuring different "dimensions" in the data. However, the 
indices are also ordered so that ZI displays the largest amount of variation, Z2 displays the second 
largest amount of variation, and so on. That is, var (Zj ~ var (Z) ~ ... ~ var (Z) , where var (Zi) 
denotes the variance of Z; in the data set being considered. The Z; are called the principal 
components (Manly, 1994). 
The purpose of this kind of analysis is that the variances of most of the indices will be so low as 
to be negligible. In that case the variation in the data set can be adequately described by the few 
Z variables with variances that are not negligible. The best results are obtained when the original 
variables are very highly correlated, positively or negatively. If that is the case then 20 or more 
original variables can be adequately represented by two or three principal components (Manly, 
1994). 
A principal component analysis (PCA) is estimated using survey data. Only 100 respondents 
participated in the market as sellers in Swayimana, whereas all respondents in lmpendle were 
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market participants. An attempt is made to define transaction costs broadly, including information 
and transport costs. The choice of transaction cost variables included in this section is a result of 
a careful assessment of the circumstances of the production and marketing environment in both 
study areas. Variables used to explain transaction cost dimensions include distance to district 
road, in Km (Xl), distance to public phone, in Km (X2) , a dummy for whether the farmer owned 
a pick up truck or car (X3) , number of years the farmer has been residing in the areas (X4) , number 
of years of the formal education attained by the farmer(Xs)' and finally, a dummy for whether the 
household head owned a TVlRadio set (X6)' The design of the survey easily allowed the 
observation of these transaction cost variables for market participants household heads. 
Household who did not participate in market as sellers were excluded from the study. 
The above mentioned transaction cost variables are assumed to influence the magnitude of 
transaction costs faced by small farmers, their choice between informal and formal marketing 
channels, and thus their level of income generated . The two distance variables (Xl and X2) are 
important in that they represent two different dimensions of the overall marketing cost faced by 
small-scale farmers . District roads are the only paved (tarred) roads in each area and facilitate 
relatively easy access to markets for inputs, outputs and services in nearby towns, especially 
Pietermaritzburg. Public phones could be used in contacting relevant service providers as well as 
other farmers within the settlement or outside. As these two distances become greater, access and 
contact become more costly for the small-scale farmer in need of inputs, information, and a 
market for their products. Distance obstacles can be offset by the ownership of means oftransport 
(car/truck) which can be used to reach nearby towns or services. The number of years a household 
has been living in an area as well as the number of years of formal education attained by the 
household head are used as proxies of the ability to network within the community. Networks are 
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thought to be very important in negotiating and enforcing contracts as well as in securing land tenure. 
Moreover, more educated and literate farmers have a higher probability of searching for innovations 
in commercial agriculture as well as in being able to contract with outsiders. Television or radio sets 
constitute a major source of information for sample farmers in both study areas. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was used to assess the dimensions of transaction costs and 
resulted in three dimensions, namely distance, assets and information, and education. Table 5.1 
presents the estimated loadings of the three dimensions for the overall sample. Results of PCA 
analysis obtained separately from each study area, and which follow the same patterns as the 
combined sample are presented in the appendix 2. 
Table 5.1 Transaction Cost Dimensions in Swayimana and Impendle (Combined data) 
n = 220 
Dimensions Eigen O/ovar. XI" X2" X3" X4" X " 5 X6" 
Distance 1.608 26.8 0.870 0.800 0.203 0.370 -0.100 0.172 
Assets 1.311 21.8 -0 .100 0.302 0.737 0.179 -0 .270 0.750 
Information 1.060 17.6 -0 .100 0.263 -0.050 0.604 0.784 0.030 
* = standardized values of X 
The first dimension accounts for 26 .8 per cent ofthe total variation in transaction costs, while the first 
two account for 48.6 per cent of the variation. The three dimensions together account for 66 .3 per 
cent of the total variation in transaction costs and mathematically can be written as follows: 
Pcl= Distance = 0.870 Xl + 0.800 X2 + 0.366 X4 ----------------------------- (1) 
Pc2= Assets = 0.302 X2 + 0.737 X3 + 0.751X6 ------------------------------ (2) 
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Pc3= Information = 0.604 X4 + 0. 784Xs ------------------------------------ (3) 
Coefficients or loadings of each variable represent its estimated value or score with respect to the 
specific component or dimension. Hence, a positive sign on the b 's indicates that an increase in 
the loading of a specific variable lowers the transaction costs associated with a specific dimension. 
In other words, households closed to the district roads and public phone exhibit higher and 
positive score (i. e. 0.870 and 0.800, respectively) and will face lower transaction cost with respect 
to distance. Moreover, households with higher level of assets, such as car/truck and Tv/ radio 
ownership (i .e. 0.737 and 0.751 , respectively) will face lower transaction costs. Finally, household 
head with high level offormal education (i.e. 0.784) and many years of residence (i .e. 0.604) in 
the specific areas can be expected to discover market information and linkages with at lower 
costs. 
Distances to a district road and to a public phone strongly influence the overall distance 
component ofthe transaction costs. Overall , residents in the two study areas had a mean distance 
to district road of 6.3 kilometres with a median distance of 5.0 kilometres. Distance to district 
road ranged from 100 metres to 30 km. With respect to public phone, the mean distance was 3.7 
kilometres with a median distance of2 .0 kilometres. The range for distance to public phone was 
between 400 metres to 17.20 kilometres. This first dimension of transaction costs is expected to 
have an inverse relationship with the number and quality of marketing channels used by the 
household. It is expected that as the transaction costs associated with distance decrease, 
marketing methods level and quality used by the household will increase. In other words, the less 
the transaction costs, the higher the marketing methods sophistication in term of quality and 
numbers. Also, improvement of secondary roads would reduce transport costs and traveling time, 
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increasing thus market participation. 
The second dimension (i.e. Assets) is explained by the ownership of a car or truck (X3) and a 
television or radio set (X6)' Only 33 .0% of respondents owned a car or bakkie while 55.4% of 
them had a TV or radio set. Ownership of private means of transport is expected to facilitate the 
transportation of agricultural products as well as the discovery of various market outlets . Market 
information are crucial for the survival of small-scale farmers in the study area. Extension officers 
and neighbouring commercial farmers were mentioned as the main sources offarming information 
with 34.6% visiting operating extension officers and 20.4% cooperating in various ways with 
commercial farmers . 
Years of residence in the respective district (X4) and the level of formal education attained by the 
household head (Xs) determine the information and third dimension of transaction costs . Higher 
level of formal schooling reduces the cost of information faced by rural farmers . Informal 
interviews pointed to the fact that new comers in both areas, but especially in Swayimana, were 
more enterprising in agriculture than those who have been in the area for so many years . The latter 
group, may be content with the little they possess or just lack the skills, information and private 
entrepreneurship needed to engage in solid commercial agriculture. The second and third 
dimensions are expected to be positively related to the level and quality of marketing channels 
used by each farm-household whereas, the distance dimension is inversely related to them. 
In conclusion, there exist strong interactions between the transaction costs, through their three 
dimensions, and the infrastructural framework under which small-scale farmers operate in both 
Swayimana and Impendle. The analysis of such interactions as demonstrated by the principal 
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component, can be very fruitful in understanding the dynamic revolving around transaction costs 
and different institutions which may help alleviate them. Given the fact that transaction costs 
affect market participation, price policies and other development policies can be expected to have 
very different behavioural and welfare implications for different sub sectors of the farm population . 
Policies that reduce these costs are consequently important complements to other development 
policies such as price policies that influence supply response. As indicated elsewhere (Sadoulet, 
et ai., 2000), lowering transaction costs through improved transportation and the promotion of 
institutions for marketing (i .e. cooperatives for selling) would increase output by both increasing 
market participation and increasing production for market participant, - a prerequisite for the 
betterment of communal farmers in the two study areas as well throughout the country. 
The following section presents a block-recursive model of transaction cost variables influencing 
marketing methods, which in turn determine the level of crop income generated by the 
households . 
5.2 DETERMINANTS OF MARKETING METHODS AND CROP INCOME 
Determinants of marketing methods and crop income are analysed in this section. To this end, 
a block-recursive model is estimated that evaluates the impact of transaction cost proxies on 
choice between different marketing (formal or informal) channels and their number for each 
household . The use and number of various marketing channels are assumed to be related to 
transaction costs as well as the size of allocated arable land to each household. 
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5.2.1. Specification of the block-recursive model 
The aim of the study is to identity market constraints such that alternatives for improving 
household agricultural incomes in rural KwaZulu-Natal can be recommended . The model 
developed in this section explains the relationship between food crop revenue and measures of 
transaction costs, resources and farmer and household characteristics. The model hypothesizes 
that food crop revenue is explained by marketing methods used, the area of cultivated land, and 
farmer and household characteristics. In turn, marketing methods are dependent on transaction 
cost variables and the full area of arable land allocated to the household . Empirically the two 
equations constitute a block-recursive model (Gujarati, 1995 :680). 
The model is specified as follows : 
Marketing methods (MKTMETHODS) = f] (Transaction costs, Land) . .......... . (1) 
Crop revenue (CROPINCOM) =f2 (Marketing methods, Cultivated land, Household and 
Farmer characteristics) . .. .. ... ... . (2) 
CROPINCOM represents the total food crop revenue, in Rand, of marketed output per 
household . MKTMETHODS describes the variety and quality of channels used by the household 
to market agricultural output (informal , i.e. neighbours, pension markets and roadside, and more 
formal channels such as hawkers, stalls in town, shops and supply contracts) . From the above 
structure (1-2), it can be seen that there is no interdependence among the endogenous variables. 
That is, MKTMETHODS affects CROPINCOM, but CROPINCOM does not affect 
MKTMETHODS. Each equation exhibit a unilateral causal dependence (Gujarati, 1995). 
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5.2.2. Transaction cost factors influencing marketing methods 
Exogenous regressors include the area of allocated arable land, the dependency ratio of the 
household and specific proxy variables for transaction costs. A regional dummy variable 
distinguishing Impendle from Swayimana is also included. The latter is closer (65 km versus 85 
km) to the urban market of Pietermaritzburg, so the dummy is expected to reflect lower 
information gathering costs. The identification of proxies for transaction costs expected to 
influence the choice of marketing channels in the study areas was based on the New Institutional 
Economics literature, especially Transaction Cost Economics (Dorward et aI. , 1998; Delgado, 
1997; Harriss-White,1999; Kormawa and Von Oppen,1997). Equation (1) was estimated as : 
Marketing methods index = f (AGEH, ACC, ELEC, COOP, DISTRA, LAND, 
D-RA TIO, DISTRICT) ..... . ..... . (3) 
where the explanatory variables and their expected signs are defined in Table 5.2. The dependent 
variable is an index showing depth in marketing methods used by the households. The greater the 
depth in marketing methods used, the greater the expected income generated from crop sales. Six 
market channels were used by 220 sample households (120 in Impendle and 100 in Swayimana), 
including neighbours, hawkers, roadside points, local shops, monthly pension markets and nearby 
towns. A set of three mutually exclusive variables was created and hierarchical scores were 
assigned to each such that neighbours and hawkers scored one (1), roadside, local shops and 
pension markets scored two (2) and towns scored four (4).The scores on these three variables 
were summed and the total was multiplied by the number of marketing channels (n) used by the 
household . Households used different techniques to inform potential customers about their 
products. 
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A binary variable was created yielding a score of one (1) for households who used notice boards 
or posters, and zero for no advertising. 
Table 5.2 Hypothesized transaction cost variables influencing marketing methods of 
households in Impendle and Swayimana, 1999 
Variable Code Description Expected Sign 
Age AGEH Age of the household head (in years) + 
Bank ACC Household head maintains a bank account (1 + 
account if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Electricity ELEC Household has access to electricity (1 if yes, 0 + 
otherwise) 
Cooperation COOP Household head cooperates with commercial + 
farmers (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Distance DISTRA Interaction between distance (in Km) and 
vehicle ownership (Distra = Km if household 
does not have a vehicle, or 0 if household 
does have a vehicle) . 
Land size LAND Size of allocated arable land, in hectares + 
Dependency D-RATIO Dependency ratio in the household 
( consumers/worker) 
Region DISTRICT Dummy variable for the district of the + 
household (1 if Swayimana; 0, ifImpendle) 
Dependent variable: Natural Log of Marketing Methods Index (LMKTMETHOD) 
The marketing methods index was computed as follows : 
Marketing methods index = {( Zchan + 5) * n)} * (Zadv +5) 
where Zchan is the standardized value of channel scores, n represents the number of channels 
used by the household and Zadv is the standardized value of the advertising dummy. The constant 
term (5) is used to remove negative values from the system. A low score on the index shows that 
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a household uses few, thinly traded markets to sell its surplus food crops. Conversely, a high score, 







Std . Dev = .98 
Mean = 0.00 
N = 215.00 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of marketing methods (LMKTMETHOD) residual 
index scores. 
Older and more experienced household heads tend to have more personal contacts, allowing trading 
opportunities to be discovered at low cost. Age may also reflect increased trust and reputation 
gained through repeated exchange with the same party (Goetz, 1992). Older household heads are 
therefore expected to face lower transaction costs and to use more marketing channels. Having a 
formal bank account (ACC) increases contact with towns, where inputs and products 
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can be bought and sold. Electricity (ELECT) reduces transaction costs by improving access to 
information through radio and television. 
Farming and marketing expertise of the large commercial farmers can positively contribute to the 
marketing practices of small-scale farmers. The cooperation (COOP) indicated by sample 
households consisted of production and marketing advice, and assistance in acquiring certain 
inputs and services (i.e. improved seeds, tractor services). Such cooperation with large 
commercial farmers is therefore expected to have a positive impact on reducing transaction costs 
and improving marketing methods. Distance and lack of transport in many parts of rural Sub-
Saharan Africa are major constraints to expanding local production. They are also a welfare issue 
for women who sometimes have to carry heavy loads of goods on their heads for long distances 
(Delgado, 1997). In this study, DISTRA represents the interaction between the ownership of a 
vehicle and distances to a public telephone and district road . The sum of the two distances is 
multiplied by a dummy scoring 1 if the household does not own a vehicle and zero otherwise. 
Consequently, distances faced by a household are not significant when in possession of a vehicle 
(car/bakkie). Ownership of a carlbakkie is expected to reduce transaction costs, offering greater 
depth in marketing methods. The size of land (LAND) is included because transaction costs are 
largely fixed costs which can be spread across more output on larger farms . Likewise, households 
with lower dependency ratios (D-RA TIO), measured as the number of dependents (i. e. infants and 
school children) per on-farm worker (i .e. non-employed adults and pensioners) in the household, 
can market a greater share of their output and therefore face lower unit transaction costs. Table 
5.3 presents the results of ordinary-least square (OLS) regression analysis of the marketing 
methods index. 
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Overall, most of the transaction cost proxies significantly influence the depth of marketing 
methods, and the signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with a priori expectations. 
Table 5.3 Results of OLS regression analysis of the marketing methods equations for 
Impendle, Swayimana and Combined samples (Dependent variable:LMKTMETHOD). 
































































***, **, * Significant at the one, five and ten per cent levels ofprobabiliry, respectively. 






























This is particularly true of cooperation with large commercial farmers, distance from telephones 
and district roads, the presence of a formal bank account and the age of the household head. 
Since the dependent variable is in natural log units, the coefficients can be interpreted in 
percentage terms. For example, the coefficient of 0.014 for AGEH indicates that a unit (year) 
increase in age of the household head leads to a 1.4 per cent increase in the marketing methods 
index score, all other explanatory variables held constant Likewise, a coefficient of - 0.176 for 
DISTRA indicates that the marketing methods index score is estimated to be about 18 per cent 
lower for households that do not own transport relative to those that do, ceteris paribus. The beta 
coefficients indicate the relative importance of each explanatory variable in the model. Thus, 
COOP and DISTRICT have the largest impact on the dependent variable. The area of arable land 
(LAND) positively influences the marketing methods index, but its impact (according to the beta 
coefficient) is less than that of COOP and DISTRA. The regional dummy is significant at the ten 
per cent level of probability but its coefficient carries an unexpected sign suggesting that 
information and transaction costs are higher in Swayimana than in Impendle. 
Separately, in Impendle, the results indicate that maintaining a formal bank account (ACC), 
distance and ownership of means of transport (DISTRA) and the age of the household head 
(AGEH) are the main determinants of the marketing methods index. The coefficient of 0.017 for 
AGEH indicates that a unit (year) increase in the age of the household head leads to a 1.7 per cent 
increase in the marketing methods index score. Likewise, a coefficient of 0.530 for ACC suggests 
that the marketing methods index score is estimated to be about 53 per cent higher for households 
that maintain a formal bank account relative to those that do not, ceteris paribus. The beta 
coefficients suggest that ACC and DISTRA have the largest impact on the dependent variable. 
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The allocated area of arable land (LAND) positively influences the marketing methods index, but 
is not significant. 
In Swayimana, cooperation '(COOP) with neighbouring commercial farmers, the allocated area 
of arable land (LAND), the dependency ratio (D-RATIO), and distance and ownership of means 
of transport (DISTRA) significantly influence the depth of marketing methods, and the signs of 
the estimated coefficients are consistent with a priori expectations. A coefficient of 0.964 for 
COOP indicates that the marketing methods index score is estimated to be 96 per cent higher for 
households that cooperate with commercial farmers relative to those that do not, ceteris paribus. 
Likewise, a unit (hectare) increase in arable land (LAND) of the household leads to a 12 per cent 
increase in the marketing methods index score, all other explanatory variables held constant. 
According to the beta coefficients, COOP has the largest impact on the dependent variable in 
Swayimana, followed by LAND, DISTRA and D-RA no. 
5.2.3. Determinants of crop income 
The variables used to estimate equation (2) are presented in Table 5.4, along with their expected 
signs. Conventionally, farm income includes both income in kind from subsistence consumption 
and income from cash sales of crops and livestock (Delgado, 1997). For the purpose of this study, 
the dependent variable is defined only as the income derived from the sale offood crops, omitting 
livestock sales. Formal livestock markets (e.g. auctions in Boston, near Impend Ie) are readily 
accessible owing to public investment in sales yards serving both commercial and small-scale 
livestock farmers. Equation (2) was estimated as : 
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CROPINCOM = f (LMKTMETHOD, CROP AREA, LIQUIDITY, HSIZE, D-RA TIO, 
VISITS, DISTRICT) ... ....... ... .. ... (4) 
It is expected that greater depth in marketing methods (LMKTMETHOD) will generate higher 
income from surplus crops. High transaction costs restrict the household to a few local markets 
where sales are discouraged by thin trading. Cultivated area (CROP AREA), measured as the area 
of allocated arable land cultivated by each household, is expected to bear positively on crop 
income because output is directly related to area cultivated. Non-farm activities and income play 
an important role in increasing the liquidity needed to purchase farming inputs. 
Liquidity (LIQUIDITY) is measured as total cash in Rand, received either from welfare (pensions) 
and disability payments, wages, remittances and other non-farm activities (brick-making, beer 
sales, etc.), and from the sale of livestock. The number of dependants, defined as number of 
school children and those of non-school age, can negatively influence marketing participation of 
the household because a large portion of the food produced is used to meet dependents ' 
consumption needs. On the other hand, the more on-farm workers in the household, the more 
likely it will produce a surplus, ceteris paribus (Low,1986) . 
Hence, the variable D-RATIO, measured as the number of dependants (i .e. infants and school 
children) per on-farm worker (i.e. non-employed adults and pensioners) in the household, is 
expected to be inversely related to surplus production and crop income. Household size is 
included only as a control variable for D-RATIO. 
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Table 5.4 Hypothesized determinants of crop income, Impendle and Swayimana, 1999 
Variable Code Description Expected Sign 
Ma.·keting methods LMKTMETHOD Marketing methods + 
index, in natural logs 
Cropped area CROPAREA Cultivated arable land;' + 
in hectares 
Liquidity LIQUIDITY Off-farm income and + 
livestock sales, in Rand 
Household size HSIZE Number of household 
members 
Dependency ratio D-RATIO Dependency ratio 
( consumers/worker) , 
Visits by extension VISITS Number of visits by + 
officers extension officers per -
year 
District of the DISTRICT Regional variable (1 = + 
"-household Swayimana, O= 
Impendle) 
Dependent variable: Food crop income (CROPINCOM) 
Visits by extension officers (VISITS) were found to be highly correlated with workshop 
participation organized by the extension services and could demonstrate the household head 's 
commitment to commercial agriculture. These visits are therefore expected to have a positive 
impact on the sale of crops. The dummy variable (DISTRICT) is used to capture agronomic 
differences between the two study districts . This variable is expected to have positive impact 
because Swayimana (DISTRICT = 1) is more fertile than Impendle (DISTRICT = 0), and also 
property rights may be more secure as the area was not subject to betterment planning, a policy 
that distanced households from their arable lands to promote soil conservation. 
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Equation (4) could be estimated using OLS if it is assumed that the error term is not correlated 
with the stochastic variable "marketing methods index". However, to account for possible 
correlation with the error term, the stochastic variable was replaced with an instrumental variable 
(estimated marketing methods index) predicted from all of the exogenous variables in the block-
recursive model. This was achieved using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) routine available in 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences, version 8. Table 5.5 summarizes the results of the crop 
income equation. Again, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships . This is 
particularly true with respect to the significant and strongly positive effects of marketing methods 
index (LMKTMETHOD), cultivated arable land (CROP AREA) and off-farm income 
(LIQUIDITY) on crop sales. 
Overall, greater depth in marketing methods, which indirectly reflects lower transaction costs 
faced by the households, has a strong positive impact on the level of income generated from crop 
sales. The lower the transaction costs faced, the greater the depth in marketing methods, and the 
higher the crop income. In absolute terms, the results suggest that a unit increase in the marketing 
methods index score will increase household crop income overall by R704.25 . Beta coefficients, 
indicating the relative importance or impact of each variable in the model, suggest that marketing 
methods have the greatest impact on crop income generated in Swayimana and for the combined 
model. In Impendle, CROP AREA has the larger impact on CROPINCOM. 
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Table 5.5 Results of 2SLS regression analysis of the crop income equation for Impendle, 
Swayimana and Combined samples, 1999 (Dependent variable: CROPINCOM). 
Variable Expected Signs Impendle (n=115) Swayimana (n=98) Combined (n=214) 
LMKTMETHOD + 532.296< 1119.474< 704.249< 
0.365b 0.660b 0.446b 
(2.0S4**) (3.760***) (3 .251 ***)' 
CROP AREA + 777.676< 142.6700 406.964< 
0.431b O. l1Sb 0.307b 
(5 .303***)' (1.3 30)' (4 .639***), 
HSIZ~ - 96.781< - 53.613< -84.309< 
-0 .12Sb -0 .066b -0 .109b 
(- 1.478)' (-0 .S65)' (-1.821 *)1 
LIQUIDITY + 0.058< 0.282< 0.10r 
0.IS5b 0.426b 0.252b 
(2.058**), (5.145***)' (3.907***)1 
VISITS + - 6.962< 57.386< 1.946< 
-O.OOSb 0.061b 0.002b 
(-0.10 1)' (0 .729)' (0.036)1 
D-RATIO - 20.284< 227.924< 18.896< 
-0.0 17b 0. 130b O.013 b 
( -0.214)' (1.499)' (0.229)' 
DISTRICT + ---------- 487.719< 
0.148b 
(2 .179**)' 
CONSTANT - 455.328< - 1454.013< -760.527< 
( -0.660)' (1. 727*), (1 .274)' 
F -statistic 9.239*** 13.638*** 14.324*** 
R2 0.337 0.47 0.326 
c Regression coefficients 
b = beta val ues 
1= t-values 
*** ** * Significant at the one, five and ten per cent levels of probability, respectively. , , 
This result shows that formal marketing channels (higher index score) are associated with higher 

















N = 110 19 7 3 15 4 26 15 12 8 
1.56 1.90 2.25 2.59 2.94 3.29 3.64 3.98 4.04 4.33 4.39 
LMKTMETHODS INDEX 
Figure 5.2 Boxplot of crop income and index scores for the combined sample (n =220) 
The boxplot displays summary statistics for the distribution. It plots the median, the 25th percentile, the 75 th 
percentile, and values that are far removed from the rest (Norussis/SPSS Inc, 1993). The median in each 
boxplot determines the central tendency and the length of the box shows the spread, or variability of 
observations. Figure 5.2 contains boxplot of income generated from the sale of crops for the overall sample. 
The results show that 50 per cent of the 220 sample households have the lowest market methods index 
scores, implying that these households were faced with relatively higher transaction costs in marketing their 
products. The figure also demonstrates that as the marketing methods index score increases, so does the level 
of crop income in general. From these plots, it can be seen that farmers with market methods scores of 1.56 
(n = 110), 1.90 (n =19) and 2.25 (n = 7) have approximately similar distributions for crop 
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income although with different extreme values . Since only one farmer scored 4.33 , there is no 
variability . Farmers who scored 2.59 (n =3), 3.98 (n = 15) and 4.39 (n =8) have much higher 
median crop incomes than other groups. With the three farmers who scored the highest (4 .39) 
having the highest median of crop income, these results confirm expectations of the income 
equation whereby farmers with higher market method index scores, implicitly facing lower 
transaction costs, are expected to yield a higher crop income. Boxplot results for each study area 
are presented separately in Appendix 4. 
The area of cultivated arable land (CROP AREA) is also significant at the one per cent level of 
probability and, according to the beta coefficients, is the second most important determinant of 
crop income after marketing methods. The results also suggest that income from non-agricultural 
activities (LIQUIDITY) is critical to farming enterprises in the two regions. Wage income and 
welfare payments, together with income from the sale of goods and services, provide the liquidity 
needed to purchase inputs and contractor services for the production and marketing of agricultural 
outputs. 
Although conforming to a priori expectations in terms of having a positive effect on the level of 
crop income, the number of visits by extension officers (VISITS) is not statistically significant. 
Extension services in the two study areas are mainly confined to small projects such as community 
gardens for subsistence. A change in the household size (HSIZE) significantly and negatively 
influences the level of income generated from the sale of crop, while the dependency ratio (D-
RA nO) has an unexpected sign but is not statistically significant. The HSIZE and D-RA no 
variables are correlated (r = 0.197 ). When household size is omitted from the income equation, 
the dependency ratio is, as expected, negatively associated with crop income. The result however 
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suggests that larger farm households with higher dependency ratios would generate less income 
from the sale of crops. As expected, the regional dummy variable (DISTRICT) coefficient is 
statistically significant. Swayimana is the more fertile area and was expected to generate higher 
crop yields. 
In conclusion, this study hypothesizes that the level of income generated from food crop sales by 
small-scale farmers in the Impendle and Swayimana regions of KwaZulu-Natal is influenced by 
transaction costs and certain household and farm characteristics. The results of a block-recursive 
model suggest that high transaction costs are detrimental to the efficient operation or existence 
of markets for inputs and outputs. The cost of information and the costs associated with the 
search for trade partners, distance to formal markets and contract enforcement are likely to 
influence the marketing of food crops. Regression analysis shows that the depth of marketing 
methods is significantly influenced by transaction cost proxies such as cooperation with large 
commercial farmers and ownership of means of transport, while a two-stage-Ieast squares (2SLS) 
analysis reveals that the level of crop income generated is determined by the depth of marketing 
methods, the size of allocated arable land and off-farm income. Households with lower transaction 
costs, and having sizeable allocated land and off-farm income can be expected to generate higher 
income from food crops. 
The next chapter presents a summary of the study results and concludes with general conclusions 
and recommendations for policy initiatives. 
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CRAPTER6 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Access to arable land has been acknowledged as one of the main features ofland reform in South 
Africa. However, many communal farmers with access to arable land are faced with various 
constraints in agriculture. Income generation from farming is one of the key factors in eradicating 
poverty and stimulating the rural economy. In this study, marketing constraints faced by communal 
farmers in the Impendle and Swayimana regions of KwaZulu-Natal were examined and binding 
constraints identified . 
The empirical analysis used data collected in 1999 from a sample of 240 households in Impendle 
and Swayimana (120 households in each area), two communal areas with high agricultural 
potential. Multi-stage sampling techniques were employed to draw a representative sample of 
house~olds, and a predesigned questionnaire was used to record information. 
Land in these communal areas is not held as private property with fully exclusive and transferable 
rights vested in individuals or juristic persons. The tribal authority allocates land to residents 
according to customary rules . On average, households had one hectare of arable land in Impendle 
and 1.8 hectares in Swayimana. Food crop production is the common feature of agriculture in the 
study areas, with potatoes in Impendle and madumbis in Swayimana being the main food crops 
produced and sold . Beans, maize and other green vegetables were some of the other crops produced 
and sold. On average, each household produced 4.2 crop types in Impendle and 5.8 enterprises in 
Swayimana. The median annual crop income was R725 in Impendle and R1200 in Swayimana. 
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The analysis also revealed that the median age of the household head was 59 years in Impendle 
and 60 years in Swayimana. The level of formal years of schooling was low, with a median of 5 
years. Overall, only 59% of household heads were able to speak and write English making it 
difficult for many households to trade outside their respective boundaries. Due to the lack of 
creditworthiness, only one household in each area used credit for the purchase of farm inputs. 
This may explain why an overwhelming number of households in Impendle would choose informal 
credit sources. This however is in contrast with Swayimana respondents who would rather deal 
with banking institutions as sources of credit. 
Marketing constraints faced by respondents in the two study areas revolved mainly around the 
lack of market outlets, transport and bad roads. Training needs included marketing skills, planning 
of production and soil conservation techniques. Government extension services were perceived 
to be inadequate with respect to the needs of individual farmers because their activities mainly 
revolved around specific projects, such as community gardens. A Chi-square (X2) analysis of 
extension visits and membership of farmers ' associations with respect to allocated arable land 
revealed that membership of farmers ' associations was significantly influenced by the size of 
allocated arable land . Most respondents with more than two hectares of allocated arable land were 
members of the local farmers ' association in Swayimana. In Impendle, however, this relationship 
was not significant. This may be explained by the fact that farm sizes showed less variation in 
Impendle. 
Transaction costs or costs of trade have generally been recognised as one of the main constraints 
impeding market participation in many developing societies, particularly those at early stages of 
transformation. Small-scale farmers in Africa share this predicament. They face high transaction 
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costs in marketing their agricultural products, due in large part to poor physical and institutional 
infrastructure. A principal component analysis (PCA) of the entire sample revealed three 
transaction cost dimensions, namely distance to markets, assets and information . 
Transaction costs, by their very nature, are difficult to measure but revolve around the overall 
distance to market centres, production and marketing information, various networks in the 
community and certain farm, household and farmer characteristics. The hypothesis that the variety 
and quality of marketing channels was influenced by transaction cost variables, which in turn 
determined the level of crop income, was tested using a block-recursive model . An index of 
marketing methods scores was constructed as a dependent variable, and results of an ordinary-
least-squares (OLS) regression analysis ofthe overall sample indicated that the depth in marketing 
channels (LMKTMETHODS) is significantly influenced by cooperation with large commercial 
farmers (COOP), interaction between distance and ownership of means of transport (DISTRA), 
allocated arable land (LAND), having a formal bank account (ACC), and the age of the household 
head (AGEH). In Impendle, operating a formal bank account, distance and ownership of means 
of transport and the age of the household head were the main determinants of the depth in 
marketing channels. In Swayimana, cooperation with nearby commercial farmers, the allocated 
area of arable land(LAND), the dependency ratio, and distance and ownership of means of 
transport were the most significant factors affecting marketing methods. 
The level of income revenue derived from the sale offood crops was used as a dependent variable 
in the second equation, and a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) analysis was used to estimate this 
model. Overall, the empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that transaction costs are a primary 
determinant of crop income. Greater depth in marketing methods, which indirectly reflects low 
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transaction costs faced by the households, has a positive influence on the level of income 
generated from crop sales. The results agree with expectations, whereby households facing lower 
transaction costs generate higher levels of crop income. Three key determinants with statistically 
significant coefficients - the depth in marketing methods (Ll\1KTMETHOD), the cultivated area 
(CROP AREA) and off-farm income (LIQUIDITY) - had positive impacts on the level of crop 
income. The significant impact of a regional dummy (DISTRICT) on crop income suggests that 
the fertility of the study area also affects crop income. 
It is clear from the results that fundamental institutional changes are required for economic 
development in these rural settlements. In terms of policy implications, it can be expected that an 
improvement in rural infrastructure (improved roads, telecommunication systems, banlcing 
facilities, legal system), an effective extension service and marketing institutions, such as market 
places and marketing associations, would reduce the costs of transacting for these small-scale 
farmers. The "public good" nature of some of these features certainly call for an important and 
strategic role for the state as a facilitating and coordinating institution. Poor infrastructure and 
lack of support services will keep a large number of communal farmers in subsistence agriculture. 
Visits by extension officers and membership offarmers ' associations represent sources of market 
information. The low level of contact between extension officers and farmers in both study areas 
suggest a need to make extension services more effective. These services should playa role in 
providing the necessary information on farming activities and the training skills (e.g. in marketing 
and soil conservation) required by emerging farmers . The sample farmers were geographically 
dispersed with secondary roads usually of poor quality, and with a volume of business insufficient 
to encourage private sector service provision. However, cooperation with large-scale commercial 
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farmers was the principal transaction cost determinant influencing the depth in marketing methods 
used by the households. This suggests that farming and marketing expertise oflarge commercial 
farmers or other well-informed farmers, if shared, could playa positive role in the small-scale 
sector. Therefore, incentives for local level arrangements encouraging such cooperation on a 
continuing basis between the two sectors should be explored and created. 
In order to compensate for missing markets and to reduce transaction costs, farmers may develop 
institutions, as a collective action, to provide needed services. At the national level, the state 
should playa key role in sustaining the regulatory framework under which market participants can 
operate. Marketing facilities (i.e. market places) and associations (i.e. grass- root marketing 
organisations), combined with secure property rights and contract enforcement, could create a 
sound environment for private sector involvement in the small-scale agricultural sector. Locally, 
both Impendle and Swayimana have ideal spaces for marketplace settings. Impendle farmers could 
use the tribal land adjacent to Impendle village along the Impendle road . The ideal location for 
a market place in Swayimana would be the space across the major taxi stop, between Swayimana 
primary school and Gcumisa clinic, along the district route. Small self-sustaining groups or 
marketing organisations based at "grass roots" level, run for and by the participants, could address 
the real marketing needs of member-farmers. The state should playa pivotal role in fostering such 
arrangements and brokering partnerships between these groups and private investors by providing 
a sound and secure environment for business. Experiences elsewhere in Mrica point to the failure 
oftop-down supply strategies. A study on market creation, identifying for instance, where market 
places can be established, to assist policymakers in their quest for a thriving small-scale sector 
would be needed. In addition, equity-sharing agribusiness ventures in transport, storage, 
packaging and other value-adding activities with partners from the commercial farming and 
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marketing sectors could greatly stimulate small farm activities in these areas. 
High transaction costs and risks also constrain the rental market for arable land in the communal 
areas ofKwaZulu-Natal. Action research conducted in other parts ofKwaZulu-Natal has shown 
that small, incremental adaptations to customary institutions can promote the rental market with 
both equity and efficiency gains in farming. Farmers gain access to additional land while non-
farming households gain rental income from land that would otherwise be underutilised. Further 
research may also seek to measure returns from investments in physical and institutional 
infrastructure. As for electronic commerce, studies can be undertaken to assess the viability of e-
commerce and its requirements in the context of communal areas with access to electricity. The 
state should also consider incentives to cellular phone providers to service these areas. 
Liquidity constraints were also mentioned as obstacles to farming in the study areas. Income 
generation through non-farm activities is crucial for investment in agriculture. Employment 
policies or strategies, therefore, should pay special attention to the factors that permit increased 
participation in non-farm income activities by at least some members of the households, since they 
would then remit or bring in extra income which can be invested in farming. To compensate for 
the lack offormal financial institutions around them most respondents relied on informal sources 
of credit such as neighbours, relatives and friends . However, some farmers would have preferred 
to have formal financial institutions as their sources of credit. Obviously, this calls for 
microfinance institutions with programmes to extend loans to resource-limited farmers . These 
farmers do not have the collateral needed to access the financial services in the formal banking 
sector. Programmes combining savings, business development training, networking and farmer 
support would be needed . However, because of recent failures, considerations should be given 
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to policies that aims to incorporate informal lending schemes (i.e. stockvel) into the broader 
financial system of the rural areas. 
To conclude, it can be stated that the two study regions present weak physical and institutional 
infrastructure, and so, a considpable potential could be mobilized if market outlets and roads 
conditions were improved. Such investments, as shown elsewhere, entail gains by improving 
aggregate productivity. If institutional and physical infrastructure innovations are implemented, 
making it easier for private traders and others to service these regions, increased agricultural 
productivity could lead to a sustainable and accelerated market development in communal areas. 
Designing the right incentives, providing public goods, and reforming inappropriate policies, so 
as to maximize the potential for higher income, is recommended. The promotion of responsive 
local initiatives combined with appropriate physical and institutional infrastructure which address 
transaction costs and access to information and assets is imperative in order to create markets and 
assist in generating higher income from farming activities. Policies or institutional innovations 
which can reduce barriers or obstacles to the marketing offood crops - such as public investments 
in improved transport, roads and telecommunication infrastructures and other public institutions 
such as security of goods, contract enforcement and marketplaces within these regions - could 
stimulate the production and marketing activities of the sample farmers. By reducing transaction 
costs in the production and marketing of food cr9ps, growth linkages can be created, promoting 
improved livelihoods in the rural areas of South Africa. 
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Summary of policy recommendations 
Emphasis is given to long-run sources of growth and what initiatives the government should 
undertake. In sum, public investments are highly recommended in research, extension, physical 
and legal infrastructure. Specifically, development strategies should include the following: 
• Invest in the improvement of physical infrastructure (e.g. roads) and means of 
communication (e.g. telephone and mail delivery). 
• Improve and broaden the scope of agricultural extension service. 
• Facilitate collective action for input supply and for discovering other marketing networks 
or outlets 
• Promote an active land rental market with long term contracts. 
• Promote cooperation between communal and commercial farmers. 
• Stimulate private sector involvement by promoting a dependable impartial contract 
enforcement mechanism within communal areas. 
• Organize periodic agricultural training sessions with rural communities. 
• Facilitate the creation of marketplaces within communal areas. 
• Identify viable off-farm alternatives for employment generation. 
Limitations of Study 
Transaction costs have been differently defined and are applied to a wide range of problems which 
has attracted an diverse set of authors, disciplines and prescriptions. Confronted with this array 
of information, the present study attempted to create an index of transaction cost proxies. The 
index does not include all determinants of transaction costs and should be viewed as an attempted 
index. Furthermore, this study is based on data collected from only 240 households across two 
districts. A larger sample covering more regions would provide more information about regional 




The purpose of this research has been to assess marketing constraints which determine market 
participation by the sample households. The study focused on factors and constraints that may 
influence income generation from farming by the communal small-scale farmers in two regions 
of KwaZulu-Natal. The identification of such factors might support efforts to create the 
appropriate environment for a viable small-scale farming sector. Generally, marketing problems 
or constraints have several dimensions, including price taker status, weather uncertainty, off-farm 
supply sources and infrastructure. In this study, however, transaction costs in exchange or trade 
and certain household characteristics were hypothesized to influence the depth and quality of 
marketing channels used, which in turn determined the level of crop revenue. To test this 
hypothesis, the New Institutional Economics (NIE), particularly Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) theory, served as the framework under which the research was conducted. Where neo-
classical theories tend to focus on economic forces to allocate resources (prices, markets and 
regulations), NIE and TCE bring in transaction costs and institutions set to reduce them into the 
equation. In so doing, they complement solutions offered by many of the neo-c1assical analyses. 
The transaction cost approach has demonstrated the impact of transaction costs on the existence 
or non-existence of markets in any economy, especially in Third World economies in early stages 
of transformation. It introduces transaction costs as the potential obstacle for market formation 
(or failure) . In contracting terms, there are ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Ex ante 
transaction costs are the costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement. Ex post 
transaction costs include all the costs associated with running contracts and correcting transaction 
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irregularities. Transaction costs are the costs of exchange, including costs of searching, screening 
trade partners, bargaining, transferring, monitoring, and contract enforcement. These costs can 
be explicit (i .e. transportation costs) or implicit (i.e. opportunity cost of time spent searching for 
partners or new market outlets). The higher these costs, the lower will the occurrence of any 
exchange be and thus the lower the profit from trade. The transaction cost approach suggests that 
marketing institutions and the state play a crucial role in decreasing transaction costs. 
Institutions are the "rules of the game"and are broadly defined as means of reducing transaction 
costs . They consist of a combination of formal rules (such as those regulating the structure of 
policy, property rights, and contracting), informal constraints (norms of behaviour or customary 
rules of the game), and enforcement practices. Implicitly, physical and institutional infrastructure 
that can reduce transaction costs become even more important for markets to operate efficiently. 
Of crucial importance is also the role of the state in securing a sound environment for the private 
sector' s involvement in the marketing of agricultural products. The state' s definitions and 
protection of property rights are essential to exchange, because they help establish, interpret and 
enforce a set of rules and procedures governing the marketing activities. The presence of 
institutions such as notarising services for property rights, security forces, banking facilities , 
courts, telecommunication services and improved access roads can increase trade. Such 
institutions not only have the effects of decreasing transaction costs, but also can lead to a greater 
involvement in all aspects of agricultural marketing by the targeted population. 
Moreover, the transaction cost approach suggests that only by tackling norms and traditions, 
under which exchange is carried out, that lowering the costs of exchange can occur. Trade is 
expected to increase as transactio? costs decline, thus affording better terms of trade, in part 
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because of the uniformity of institutional structures among trade partners. The transaction cost 
approach calls for adequate infrastructure, including transport and telecommunication networks, 
that permit the efficient movement of information, goods and services. 
This study is based on data collected in surveys conducted first in the communal area of 
Swayimana during January/February 1999 from a sample of 120 small-scale farmers, and in 
Impendle region during AprillMay 1999, also from a sample of 120 small-scale farmers. The study 
hypothesises that the depth in marketing methods (i.e. number and quality of marketing channels) 
is influenced by transaction cost factors and some household head characteristics, which in turn 
determine the level of crop income. Little research has been done on the impact of transaction 
costs faced by small-scale farmers on the marketing of their products in the communal areas of 
South Africa. The two study areas ofImpendle and Swayimana represent two distinct bioclimatic 
regions ofK waZulu-Natal, both with high agricultural potential. Multi-stage sampling techniques 
were used to collect data, which were recorded in a predesigned and tested questionnaire. One 
of the characteristics of farmers within the two regions is that they are in transition from 
subsistence to commercial farming. As these farmers progressively become market-oriented, they 
inevitably become subjected to trade costs. Thus, the level of transaction costs faced by a 
household would determine the combination of cash and subsistence crops to produce. 
Sample farmers in the study areas grew more than one food crop for sale and for home 
consumption. The most dominant feature of agriculture in these regions is the prominence of 
livestock husbandry in Impendle and food crop production in Swayimana. Farmers devote most 
of their allocated arable land to food crops such as madumbi, maize, potatoes, beans, and various 
leafy vegetables. These traditional subsistence food crops have also become important cash crops. 
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Maize is the staple diet of most residents and was produced by virtually all surveyed households. 
In addition, madumbi was produced by over 90 per cent of the sample households in Swayimana. 
For both regions, however, the only other crops cultivated by at least half of the surveyed 
households were potatoes and dry beans. A wide variety of minor crops such as sweet-potatoes, 
cabbage, spinach and other green leafy vegetables were produced. Off-farm income sources varied 
from wage employment in towns, brick-making, wage remittances and beverage sales. 
The results indicate that the majority of sample household sell their produce mainly through 
informal channels such as neighbours, pension markets and local shops. Poor roads and 
communication systems, transport, capital constraints and low levels of education were some of 
the major constraints faced by farmers in the study areas. Marketing facilities and skills were 
lacking and extension services were inadequate. The two study areas are relatively well served by 
taxi passenger vans: a trip to Swayimana, for instance, takes about an hour from the provincial 
city of Pi eterma ritz burg. Residents of these areas often commute to Pietermaritzburg and adjacent 
towns (Wartburg, Pinetown, Howick and Durban), sometimes on a daily basis to work and/or 
trade. 
Empirical analysis agrees with the hypothesis that transaction costs are a primary determinant of 
crop income level. The most influential transaction cost factors are related to the variety and 
quality of marketing channels (LJ\.1KTMETHODS) used by the household to market agricultural 
output. Overall, the variety and quality of marketing channels(i.e. depth) is significantly influenced 
by the cooperation with neighbouring commercial farmers, the distance and means of transport 
interaction, and the size of allocated arable land . Greater depth in marketing methods, which 
indirectly reflects lower transaction costs faced by the household, has a positive influence on the 
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level of income generated from crop sales. The results agree with expectations, whereby 
households facing lower transaction costs generate higher levels of crop income. Three key factors 
with statistically significant coefficients - the depth in marketing methods (LMKTMETHODS), the 
size of cultivated arable land (CROP AREA) and off-farm income (LIQUIDITY) - positively 
influence the level of crop income (CROPINCOM). The significant impact of the regional dummy 
on crop income implies that the fertility of the study area also affects crop yield. 
The policy implications of the results are that there may be substantial benefits in developing better 
infrastructure to effectively link these production areas to market centres, and in improving market 
knowledge by providing more relevant, accurate public market information and farming skills. 
Transaction costs could be significantly reduced if better roads and marketing facilities were 
provided. Therefore, specific policies addressing the constraints and limitations of communal 
farmers through physical and institutional change, market information, development of communal 
or rural markets, and provision of appropriate incentives are required. More research is however 
needed to identify the most efficient ways of generating higher crop income for communal farmers. 
In sum, it can be stated that market development in the study areas is constrained by poor physical 
and institutional infrastructure and weak socio-economic status of household heads . Major 
constraints include poor roads and communication systems, transport, the absence of a rental 
market for land, an uncertain legal system, low levels of education and limited knowledge of 
English amongst household heads . Consequently, many households face high transaction costs in 
input, credit and product markets. This study has demonstrated that transaction costs affect 
marketing participation and thus income generation by small-scale farmers in the two study areas. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL 
DISCIPLINE OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
Household Questionnaire 
1)i\1rIC: ----------------- I~1rICIt"IIC~ICIt'S ~i\~IC:-----------------------
These questions relate to all household members including members not present at the time of 
interview (e.g., migrant workers who contribute to household income). A household refers to a 
family that has its own crop land, or a group of families that have rights to the same crop land. 
The information provided here is strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes only 
by staff of the Discipline of Agricultural Economics, University of Nata!' 
Geographic position and Region 
KwaZulu-Natal 
District and Place 
Betterment planning implemented? 
------Yes or No 
Random No. 
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SECTION 1: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
1.1 Household composition (please mark respondent with an X) 
Household Sex Age Occupation* Cash Cash Pension or Education * * 
member income per remitted per disability 
month month payment per 
(Rand) (Rand) 
month (Rand) 
IMaie head M 
2 Female F 
head 
*OccupatlOn should be categorized as Wage Employed (E), Self-employed (SE-e.g. farmer, taxI, etc.), 
Housekeeper (H), Scholar or Student (S), Disabled (D) if in receipt of a disability grant, Pensioner (P) if in 
receipt of a pension, Unemployed (U) if seeking work, Infant (1) if too young to attend school, or Vagrant (0) 
**Education: school standard passed. 
1.2 Can the family member responsible for management decisions (such as what to produce) 
speak/write English? 
SPEAK ------------ YeslNo 
WRITE --------------YeslNo 
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1.3 Other non-farm income earned during past year. 
Activity Cash income during past year (Rand) 
Handicraft 
Rental income from land 
Hiring out equipment 
Temporary work (e.g. on farms) 
Block making 
Repairs to cars & houses 
Retailing food & beverages 
Taxi service 
Hawking or processing products 
purchased from farmers 
Other (please specify) 
SECTION 2: FARM CHARACTERISTICS 
2.1 What is the size of your land holding (specify units)? 
2.2 Are you satisfied with the size of your farm? -------------------- YeslNo 
2.3 How far is your arable land from your house?(ifbetterment location) 
--------------------}(m 
2.4 Are you satisfied with the location of your farm? 







2.5 Does the household have more than one plot of arable land in different areas?-----YeslNo 
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2.6 Does the household have access to land in a community garden? ------------YeslNo 
2.7 If "Yes", is that land irrigated? ------------YeslNo 
2.8 What is the size of your garden plot? ( specify units) 
2.9 Did the household plant all of its own arable land last season? -------------YeslNo 
2.10 If "no", what portion of its arable land did it plant? (Tick where appropriate) 






2.11 List the main reasons for not cultivating all of the arable land. 
1. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------__ 
3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------______________ _ 
4. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_______________ _ 
2.12 Did the household lease or lend any of its unused land to another household to grow 
crops last season? 





2.14 Does your house have electricity? --------------YeslNo 
2.15 Does your house have access to a telephone? --------------YeslNo 
2.16 How far is the nearest public phone? -----------------FCm 
2.17 Does your house have access to a postal service? --------------Y eslN 0 
2.18 How far is the nearest mail box? ------------------FCrn 
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SECTION 3: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
3.1 Were any of the following crops produced last season (1997 /1998)? 
Crops grown during past year 
Crop Grown Sold Value of Where Distance Mode of Frequency Unsold 
during during sales sold? * to transpol1ing of 
past year past year market l)roduce ** marketing 

















*Hawkers (HA), Neighbours (NE), local shops (L), Pensioners market (PM), Millers (MIL) , Chain stores (CS), 
Municipal market (MM), Government agency (GA), Informal market in town (TO), Roadside stall (RS). 
**Carried by household members (Carry), Own vehicle (Own V), or Service e.g. bus, taxi or 
contractor(Contract) 








3.3 Would you like to grow or farm something else? -------------y eslN 0 




3.4 Do you think that there is a market for the products mentioned in 3.3 'J 
----------------Y eslN 0 
SECTION 4: LIVESTOCK 
4.1 Which of the following does the household have? 
Livestock Number Number Sales value Where Distance to 
owned sold (Rand) sold?* the market 













Eggs sales ~"~ ~,~ 
Milk sales ~,~ ~~~" 
Other 
(specify) 
*Hawkers (HA), Neighbours (NE), local shops (LS), Pensioners market (PM), Chain stores (CS), Government 
saleya rds (GS), lnformal markets in town (TO), Private saleyards (e.g Stockowners) (PS), Private abbatoir (AB) . 
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SECTION 5: FARMING EXPENSES 
5.1 Which of the following items did the household use last season? 
Inputs Used Quantity Total Supplier Transport Credi Source of 
(YIN) used cost * (method of) t used credit *** 













~ ~ ~ Tractor ploughing services 
Transport services ~ ~,,~ ~""" Draught animals ~"" "\ ~,,~ ~""~ Farm labour ~,,~ ~" '\.'\ 
*Shop or Depot (shop), Savings club (club), Fanners ' association/cooperative (coop), Neighbour (local) 
**Delivered by Supplier (Deliv) , Carried (Carry), Own vehicle (Own V) or Hired Service e.g. bus, taxi , 
or contractor (Contract). 
***Locallender (local), Supplier (suppl), Commercial Bank (bank), KFC (KFC), Savings club (club). 
****Mixes = composite fertilizers like 2.3 .2, 3.2.1 , etc. 
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SECTION 6: INVESTMENT IN CAPITAL EQUIPMENT AND ASSETS (movable) 




















Maize mill equipment 
Yes or No 
- Hand operated ---------------YeslNo 
- Motorized --------------------YeslNo 
- Electric -----------------------YeslNo 
Number owned 
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SECTION 7: SAVING ACTIVITY 
7.1 Does the household have a savings account? --------------YeslNo 
7.2 How far is the closest banking branch from your house? ---------------- rem 
7.3 Can you get a taxi when you need one? ---------------YeslNo 
7.4 How far are you from the taxi/bus route? ------------------rcrn 
7.5 How many hours does it take to get from your house to town and back if a taxiibus service 
is used? ------------Hours 
SECTION 8: TENURE CHARACTERISTICS 
8.1 How long has your family lived here? ----------------Years 




Long term lease 
Government allocation 
Tribal authority allocation 
Other (specify) 




d) other (specify) 
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8.4 If your family owns the land, do you have any proof of ownership (Title of deeds, Tax 
certificate, etc)? ----------------Y eslNo 
8.S Has the household made any fixed improvements on its land? ------------YeslNo 








Timber (tree crops) 
Water points for livestock 
Silage pit / Silo 
Other (specify) 
SECTION 9: LAND RIGHTS 
9.1 Are other people allowed to use your land (e.g for grazing during winter)?----------YeslNo 
9.2 Have you ever fenced in your arable land to protect it from stray cattle?------------YeslNo 
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If No, why not? (Tick where appropriate) 
Reason 
Not allowed to fence off 
arable land 
People steal fences 
Fencing is too expensive 
No need for fencing 
Other (specify) 
9.3 Can the household rent out its unused land to another farmer? --------------YeslNo 
9.4 Can the household sell part of its land if it wants to --------------YeslNo 
SECTION 10: MARKETING AND FARMERS' INSTITUTIONS 
10.1 How do the buyers that buy directly from you, know about your products? 
- Product I ----------------------------------------
- Product 2 ----------------------------------------
- Product 3 ----------------------------------------
- Product 4 ----------------------------------------
10.2 Do you process your own farm products (e. g selling meals, selling maas)? ---------Y eslN 0 
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10.3 What agricultural products are processed and how are they sold? 
Products Sold as* Where sold?** 
, 
*Meals (meal), Packaged maas/milk (pack), Other (specify). 
**Hawkers (hawk), Neighbours (neigh) , LocaJ shops (shop), Pensioners 'market (pension), Hospital (hosp) , 
Schools (school), Other (specify). 
10.4 If you cannot sell your surplus product, what do you do with it? 
- Surplus Product 1 ---------------------------------------
- Surplus Product 2 ---------------------------------------
- Surplus Product 3 ---------------------------------------
- Surplus Product 4 ----------------------------------------
10.5 What are the main obstacles to marketing your products? 
1. ----------------------------------------------- __ _ 
2. --------------------------------------___________ _ --------------------------------------------
3. ----------------------------------_______________ _ --------------------------------------------
4. ---------------------------------------__________ _ ------------------------------ -------------
10.6 How do you set or obtain a price for your products? 
- Product 1 ---------------------------------_______ _ --------------------------------------------
- Product 2 ---------------------------------_______ _ --------------------------------------------
- Product 3 --------------------------------________ _ --------------------------------------------
- Product 4 ----------------------------____________ _ ----------------------------------------
156 
10.7 Do any of the following happen in the marketplace? 
Market* 
Taxi owners threaten 
you if you do not use 
their services 
Other sellers threaten 
you if your price is 
lower 
Other sellers threaten 
you if buyers buy only 
from you instead of 
them 
Other sellers threaten 
you if you are a 
newcomer to the 
marketplace 
Products are stolen 
Buyers only want to 
buy on credit 
Buyers refuse to pay 
after they bought on 
credit 
*Pensioners ' market (pension), Roadside stall (roadside) , Informal market in town (town), Municipal market 
(munic) , Other (specify) , 
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10.8 Which marketing channels are you mostly satisfied with? (Tick where appropriate) 


















10.10 What do you think your local and national authorities could do to help you improve your 
marketing? 
Solutions 1 2 
GOVERNMENT 
TRIBAL AUTHORITY 





Tractor and ploughing 
services 
Pest control 
Part- time work 
Transport services 
Other (specify) 
10.12 If "no", would you like to have any? ---------------- YeslNo 
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10.13 Contract (Marketing) disputes 
10.13.1 Have you or your family ever had a dispute with a buyer over a marketing (sale) contract 
--------------Y eslN 0 
- If"yes", what was the dispute over? 
Conflict source YeslNo Dispute with * Settled/resolved by: * * 
Quantity agreed upon 
Price agreed upon 
Quality agreed upon 
Time agreed upon 
Method of payment 
Other (specify) 
*Dispute with: Neighbour (neigh), Shopkeeper (shopk), Miller (miller), Hawker (hawk) , Other (specify). 
** Resolved by: Themselves (selves), Tribal councillors (council), Magistrate (magist) , Government official 
(official). 
10.13.2 Do you know of anyone in the last 2-3 years who has appeared in court for not respecting 
a marketing contract? 
--------------Y eslN 0 
10.13.3 Was it at a tribal court or magistrates court ---------------TriballMagist 
SECTION 11: EXTENSION 
11.1 Can you get farming information when you need it? --------------YeslNo 
If "yes", where do you get it from? -------------------------------------_________________________ _ 
11.2 What is the agricultural extension officer's name? ----------------___________________ _ 
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11.3 How many times did the extension officer make contact with you 
or another member of your household during the past 3 months? --------------'Iisits 
11.4 How many times did your family contact an extension officer during the past 3 months? 
--------------Contacts 
11.5 Were any of the following training courses offered in this area during the past year? 
Course Yes or No Course offered by? * Did any member of your family attend? 












*Government (govern) , Other (specify) 
11.6 What type of agricultural training would you like to receive? 
1. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------______________ _ 
2. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------_________________________________ _ 
3. -------------------------------------------------------------------------________ _____________________________ _ 
11. 7 How far are you to the nearest tar road? ---------------------f(m 
11.8 How far are you to nearest main gravel road? ------------------f(rn 
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11.9 Does any household member currently belong to a farmers ' cooperative, 
farmers ' association or garden club? ----------------YeslNo 
SECTION 12: GENERAL PROFILE 
12.1. MAIN REASON FOR KEEPING THIS LAND (please rank) 
Reason 1 2 
Commercial agriculture 
Subsistence agriculture 






12.2 Do you know that you can borrow money from the bank or other institutions if you want to? 
------------------YeslNo 
SUPPLEMENTARY HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Where do you buy your foodstuffs (cabbage, spinach, mealies, etc.), if not self-produced? 
(Tick where appropriate) 
- Neighbours -----------------
- Commercial farmers -------------------------
- In town (Wartburg, PMB, Pinetown, Durban) -------------------
- Other (specify) --------------------------
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APPENDIX 2 
TRANSACTION COST DIMENSIONS IN THE TWO STUDY REGIONS 
Table A2.1 Transaction Cost Dimensions in Swayimana (n =100) 
Components Eigen v. XI X2 X3 X 4 Xs X6 
Distance 2.044 0.950 0.952 0.010 0.388 0.152 0.228 
Assets 1.241 0.005 0.004 0.773 0.380 0.002 0.703 
Information 1.122 0.200 0.211 0.003 0.532 0.840 0.219 
The first component, representing the overall distance, with Eigen value of2.044, accounted for 
34 per cent of the variation in transaction costs . The first two components accounted for 54.7 per 
cent, the three components for 73.4 per cent. 
Table A2.2 Transaction Cost Dimensions in lmpendle (n =120) 
Component Eigen v. XI X2 X3 X 4 Xs X6 
Assets 1.491 0.589 0.100 0.647 0.195 0.060 0.822 
Distance 1.200 0.411 0.817 0.264 0.519 -0.145 0.050 
Education 1.123 0.431 0.010 0.397 -0 .294 0.832 -0 .010 
Status 0.935 0.060 0.350 0.315 0.752 0.378 0.050 
The first component, with 1.491 Eigen value, accounted for 24.8 per cent of the variation in 
transaction costs. The first two components (i.e information and distance) accounted for 44.8 per 
cent, the four components for 79 .1 per cent. 
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2. Where do you expect to get better quality foodstuffs? (Please rank) 





3. Do you like to buy foodstuffs and other items from people you personnaly know or do not 
know? 
KNOW ---------------YeslNo 
DON'T KNOW ---------------YeslNo 





5. If you want to borrow money, where would you go? (Tick where appropriate) 
- Bank ---------------------------
- Government lenders (KFC, etc.) ------------------------------
- Private lenders -----------------------------------------------___ _ 
- N eighbou rs -----------------------------------------_____________ _ 
- Relatives or Friends --------------------------------------_____ _ 
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APPENDIX 3 
Block-Recursive Model Syntax 
Step # 1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Dependent variable = LMKTMETHODS = f {Ageh; Acc; Elec; Coop; Distra; Land; D-ratio; 
(District) } 
RUN 
Step # 2 Two-Stages-Least squares (2SLS) 
Dependent variable = CROPINCOM = f (Lmktmethods; Crop area; Liquidity; Hsize; D-ratio; 
Visits; District) 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Ageh; Acc; Land; Distra; Elec; D-ratio; Coop; (District); Visits; 
Croparea; Liquidity; Hsize; District. 
165 
APPENDIX 4 















i 0 10 • Ii_ 
o 
-2000 .l....-_.------._-"T_----r_--.-_--r-_--r-_-r-_....--_..----' 
N = 58 3 2 12 2 8 6 5 3 
1.56 1.90 2.25 2.59 2.94 3.29 3.64 3.98 4.04 4.39 
LMKTMETHOD index 
From these plots, it can be seen that Swayimana fanners with market methods scores of 1.90 (n = 
3) and 2.25 (n = 2) have similar distributions for crop income although those with a 1.90 score have 
several extreme values. Since only one fanner scored 2.59, there is no variability. The last four 
groups have much higher median crop incomes than other groups, with the three fanners who scored 
the highest (4.39) having the highest median of crop income. Results confirm expected results of the 
income equation whereby fanners with higher market method index scores, implicitly facing lower 
transaction costs, are expected to yield a higher crop income. 
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2000 ~ .. 0 




N = 52 16 5 2 3 2 18 9 7 5 
1.56 1.90 2.25 2.59 2.94 3.29 3.64 3.98 4.04 4.33 4.39 
LMKTMETHODSINDEX 
NOTE ABOUT BOXPLOTS 
The lower boundary of each box is the 25th percentile and the upper boundary is the 75th percentile. 
The horizontal line inside the box represents the median. Fifty percent of the cases have values 
within the box. The length of the box corresponds to the interquartile range, which is the difference 
between the 75th and 25th percentiles. The boxplot includes two categories of cases with outlying 
values. Cases with values that are more than 3 box-lengths from the upper or lower edge of the box 
are called extreme values. On the boxplot, these are designated with an asterisk (*). Cases with 
values that are between 1.5 and 3 box-lengths from the upper or lower edge of the box are called 
outliers and are designated with a circle. The largest and smallest observed values that are not 
outliers are also shown. Lines are drawn from the ends of the box to these values. From the median, 
the central tendency, or location can be determined. From the length of the box, the spread, or 
variability, of the observations can be determined. If the median is not in the centre of the box, then 
the observed values are skewed. If the median is closer to the bottom of the box than the top, the data 
are positively skewed. If it is closer to the top, the opposite is true: the distribution is negatively 
skewed. Boxplots are particularly useful for comparing the distribution of values in several groups 
(SPSS Inc, 1993). 
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APPENDIX 5 
FARMERS' REACTIONS ABOUT STUDIES CONDUCTED IN THEm AREAS. 
-- We have seen people coming here to ask us questions, but never heard from them once they 
leave. Is your research one of those too? 
-- We really need some kind of help to find new markets for our produce. Most of the time we 
don't know what to do after we have produced. 
-- We would really appreciate if you can do something for us as far as improving our marketing 
situation is concerned. 
-- We would like to get a space here, so that we can use it as a public fresh produce market. 
Everyone could bring whatever he/she has to sell, at least twice a week. Once this place is known 
throughout the region, middlemen from town can come here. 
-- What is discouraging is the fact that some people around here are so lazy to farm, that they 
resort to stealing fresh produce straight from the fields of those who are farming. We need strong 
and tough laws against those criminals, once apprehended. 
-- My allocated plot of land is too small given all the mouths to feed in this family . With some 
extra land, maybe I can plant more and sell the surplus. 
-- I hope that your research project is not from the government, because those folks come here 
with all the promises which they cannot keep. We will be very happy if you can come up with 
some practical solutions to our marketing problems. 
-- There is no money in farming . It is better and easier to work in town. 
-- There is a lot of competition around here, since everyone is selling the same product(s). 
-- We need money so that we can plough the entire allocated land and afford to buy all the inputs. 
-- The soil in Impendle is very poor. You need a lot of fertilizer or lime if you want to get a better 
result. And this requires a lot of money for inputs, which we don't have. 
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-- We cannot compete with commercial farmers around here (Swayimana), since they plant the 
same crops as us and which they can afford to sell at very cheap prices within our area. These 
people want to undermine us. They don ' t want us to succeed. 
-- Many farmers here lack vision and private initiative. They do not have the sense of business. 
In short, I can say that they are lazy. They expect the government to help them with everything. 
